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Lost in the Translation: Two Legal
Cultures, the Common Law Judiciary
and the Basic Law of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative

Region
Ann D. Jordan*
Introduction
Hong Kong's common law legal system will not survive the 1997 transfer of
sovereignty to China intact. It will slowly be transformed into a capitalist
common law/socialist civil law system, tempered by political realities
rather than forged by a coherent set of legal principles. The formal source
of the conflict is the Basic Law,' a Chinese state-level law written by mainland Chinese scholars and officials with input from Hong Kong officials.
The Basic Law is the national expression of China's promises contained in
the Joint Declaration, 2 the 1984 agreement whereby Britain transfers sovereignty over Hong Kong to China. The Basic Law implements the Joint Declaration, contains the essential terms and conditions for creation of Hong
Kong as a separate political and legal entity within China, and constitutes
the highest law of the post-handover Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region (HKSAR). Unfortunately, it also imposes incompatible elements of
the socialist civil law system upon Hong Kong's common law legal system
and, consequently, poses a threat to the survival of Hong Kong's independent judiciary and legal system. Nonetheless, there has been remarkably
little commentary in Hong Kong exposing this threat. The silence, I
believe, is due to the tendency of public discourse in Hong Kong to assume
a common law perspective in matters concerning interpretation of the
Basic Law.
* Lecturer-in-Law, The Chinese University of Hong Kong; Fulbright ProfessorJilin
University, Changchun, People's Republic of China (1990-91); Fulbright Professor, City

University of Hong Kong (1989-90); J.D., Columbia University School of Law; B.A.,
Columbia University School of General Studies.

1. The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's
Republic of China, adopted by the National People's Congress on April 4, 1990, 29
LL.M. 1511 (1990) [hereinafter Basic Law].
2. Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question
of Hong Kong, Sept. 26, 1984, U.K.-P.R.C., 1984 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmd. 9352),
reprinted in 23 LL.M. 1366, 1371-72 (1984) [hereinafter Joint Declaration].
30 CoRN'an. INr'L LJ. 335 (1997)
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The purpose of this Article is to expand the debate to include the Chinese perspective in order to understand the extent to which China's legal
system is inscribed on the surface and imbedded in the language of the
Basic Law text. The Article also considers the extent to which the socialist
civil law perspective is present in Chinese interpretations of Basic Law provisions relating to the judiciary. The Article focuses on the most basic constitutional issue threatening the survivability of the future HKSAR
judiciary, namely, limitations on the scope of judicial powers. The Article
first introduces each contentious Basic Law provision from the Chinese
and Hong Kong perspectives. Then it considers public statements and
writings on the issue by influential scholars and officials from both mainland China and Hong Kong. Finally, it analyzes alternative interpretations
and solutions that emerge from the borderline where the two legal cultures
meet and resist each other.
The mixture of common law and socialist civil law concepts and language has already given rise to verbal disputes between common-lawtrained and socialist civil-law-trained legal professionals and politicians
over linguistic, cultural and political control of the Basic Law content. The
vigorous public debates are essentially struggles over whose legal principles and whose cultural values will prevail. For example, in one dispute
involving interpretation of the Basic Law, a member of the future HKSAR
government rejected the application of common law principles when he
"accused some members of the [Hong Kong] legal profession of wrongly
applying British legal traditions." 3 Unfortunately, the Basic Law virtually
guarantees that common law principles and values will be seriously compromised after 1997.
An essential element for retaining Hong Kong's present capitalist system and lifestyle is the preservation of the present independent judiciary.
However, independence is not assured because both explicit and imprecibe
wording in the Basic Law provide considerable scope for culture conflict
and incompatible interpretations that are capable of undermining Joint
Declaration promises. Nonetheless, all solutions to Basic Law puzzles
must be organized around, and not deviate from, China's commitments in
the Joint Declaration. China promises to permit the HKSAR to "enjoy a
high degree of autonomy," to "be vested with .

.

. independent judicial

power," and to allow its "previous capitalist system and life-style [to]
remain unchanged for 50 years." 4 These promises are intended to preserve
Hong Kong's pre-handover system to the maximum extent possible. Therefore, at a minimum, they provide a strong source of support for the position taken in this Article, namely, that China must resolve all ambiguities
in favor of the common law interpretation. Unfortunately, even if China
agrees to adopt a common law perspective regarding ambiguous provisions, a number of unambiguous Basic Law provisions undermine the Joint
Declaration's commitment to an independent judiciary and legal system.
3. Linda Choi, NPC Can Be Unreasonable,Says Convenor, So.
Mar. 27, 1997, at 8.
4. Joint Declaration, supra note 2, art. 3 & Annex I.

CHINA MORNING POST,
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Most worrisome are provisions that import civil law principles and practices into Hong Kong. These provisions are capable of sounding the death
knell of judicial review as presently practiced in Hong Kong and must be
amended if the common law is to be preserved.
I. Conflicting Legal Cultures and Legal Languages
Part I establishes a conceptual framework for the textual analysis of Basic
Law provisions in Part II. It introduces the fundamentally distinctive and
conflicting characteristics of Hong Kong's and China's legal systems and
legal languages.
A. Two Legal Cultures
1. Hong Kong's British Common Law Culture
The modem British common law legal system derives from a Western epistemology based upon notions of rationality, scientific thinking and truth.
Its methodology applies reason and rational thinking to facts and law. The
scientific tools of investigation separate legally material facts of the case
from irrelevant or background facts. The system is coherently structured
and organized and has its own internal logic. The application of reason
and scientific analysis is commonly believed to result in a clear understanding of the truth of the case, which, when applied to the law, means
justice is served. 5 The scientific method, which is highly valued in Western
societies, elevates law and the legal process above other forms of knowledge and other methods for meting out justice.
The common law legal system requires procedural justice as well as
substantive justice-without the former, the latter cannot be guaranteed.
The system sets out objective legal procedures that, under a rule of law
system, are applied equally to everyone, including rulers. The rule of law
system has been accepted by the majority of Hong Kong people, who
respect the power of the law and common law legal institutions.
[T]he common law heritage has given Hong Kong not just a neat set of rules
but an attitude of mind, not mere rules of action but also ways of acting, not

just "Rule by Law" but "the Rule of Law." It is these attitudes and forms of
conduct as well as the spirit of the Rule of Law that are particularly difficult
to translate into legal norms, especially in a context where radically different
principles and attitudes are espoused by the incoming sovereign authority.6
Above all, Hong Kong people expect the law to protect them from abuses of
political power. 7 These attitudes and values are incompatible with the Chi-

5. For a critical analysis of the scientific method, see generally SANDRA HARDING,
WHOSE SCIENCE? WHOSE KNOWLEDGE? THINKING FROM WOMEN'S LIVES (1991).
6. Dennis Chang, Towards a Jurisprudenceof a Third Kind-"One Country, Two Systems," 20 CAsE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 99, 110 (1988).

7. The degree to which the British common law system has been integrated into the
culture and consciousness of the people of Hong Kong is, of course, relevant to the
question of whether the Hong Kong public will accept the new legal order. However, as
Hong Kong people will have little influence over the resolution of the issues discussed in
this Article, their views are not included. For more on Hong Kong's legal culture, see
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nese legal system.
2. China's Socialist Civil Law Culture
China does not have a legal culture in the Western sense of a set of cultural
beliefs in the primacy of law as an instrument of social control and legal
institutions as the appropriate forum for enforcing correct social behavior.
Rather, "[t]he foundation of Chinese culture is the concept of 'rule of etiquettes' and the concept of 'no litigation.'" 8 The traditional Chinese means
of social control is based on Confucianism, which is given expression
through a complicated sets of rituals, practices and class and gender codes
of conduct (li). The nearest approximation in Confucian culture to law in
the Western sense is a set of criminal punishments (fa) that are found in
the pre-socialist Qing Code.
After the Communist Revolution, China adopted a civil law system. So
far, however, the new legal system has been unsuccessful in replacing traditional cultural beliefs that law is morally inferior to li. Since the start of the
modernization drive in 1979, China has made numerous unsuccessful
attempts to create a rule of law culture. 10 Despite the existence of hundreds of new laws, China remains a rule by law system rather than a rule of
law system. As one scholar notes, "Marxist-Leninist ideology converges
with Confucianism in a sense: they share a common distrust of, or lack of
respect for, the rule of law." 1 According to orthodox Marxist-Leninist theory, bourgeoisie law is a tool of the ruling classes used against the people.
Socialist law, however, is an instrument of the people because the party,
which represents and protects the interests of the masses, controls the law.
As a result of the socialist distrust of law, some notable aspects of the Chinese system are legal flexibility, lack of procedural regularity and the
supremacy of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) policy. Some notable characteristics of the Chinese people are a high degree of distrust, if not disdain, for law and a preference, even by victims of criminal acts, for settling
conflicts privately.
The Chinese distrust for the law and political preoccupation with controlling the legal system stand in stark contrast with Hong Kong's common
law rule of law philosophy. This difference is discernible in the often confusing and imprecise language of the Basic Law.
Anthony Neoh, Hong Kong's Future: The View of a Hong Kong Lawyer, 22

CAL. W. INT'L
LJ.309 (1992); Kuan Hsin-chi, Legal Culture: The Challenge of Modernization, in INDICA.
TORS OF SOcIAL DEva.opNMEr: HONG KONG 1990, at 159 (Lau Siu-Kai et al. eds., 1992);
LAU Su-KAi & KuAN HSiN-CHI, THE ETHos OF THE HONG KONG CHINESE 119-45 (1988).
8. Yang Kaixiang, A ComparativeStudy of Judges' Status, 137 SHANGHAI FAXUE [UURISPRUDENcE] 45 (Apr. 10, 1993), translated in JPRS-CAR-93-041, at 28 (F.B.I.S. June 21,

1993).

9. See generally SYBI.L VAN DER SPRENKEL, LEGAL INsTrrUTIONS IN MANCHU CHINA: A
(1977); T'UNG-Tsu CH'U, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRADITIONAL CHINA
(1965).
10. See, e.g., Agatha Ngai, Lawmakers Angry at Lack of Enforcement, So. CHINA
MORNING Post, Mar. 15, 1997, at 9.
11. Albert H.Y. Chen, Justice After 1997, in CiamE AND JUSTICE IN HONG KONG 172,
182 (Harold Traver &Jon Vagg eds., 1991).
SOCIOLOGIcAL ANALYsis
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B. Two Legal Languages
Law is a living language: it has a history, a vocabulary and a point of view.
China's and Hong Kong's legal languages are no exceptions. China's and
Hong Kong's legal histories and jurisprudences, although once the same,
have developed along different paths since Britain's colonization of Hong
Kong and China's transformation to socialism. The two jurisdictions have
developed distinct legal cultures and mutually-unintelligible legal languages. After more than 100 years of colonial rule and the common law,
the meanings Hong Kong people attach to legal terms in the Chinese language are imbued with common law assumptions and referents. Likewise,
more than fifty years of socialism have altered the meaning of legal terms in
China. As a result, although Chinese people on both sides of the border
utter the same legal words, they do not speak the same legal language.
Legal discussions between people in Hong Kong and the Chinese mainland
are often no more than mutually uninformative cross-talk In fact, Hong
Kong people are really in no better position to understand China's legal
system than are people who do not speak or read Chinese.
Certainly, Chinese terms for common law terms exist, but translation
is more than merely finding equivalent terms. Properly executed, translation captures the essence of the language so that the message imbedded in
those terms is transmitted by the messenger, i.e., by the words. Successful
translation exposes, rather than submerges, cultural differences. It creates
dialogue rather than lulls the recipient into complacency. It does not permit the recipient to assume she understands the speaker's meaning. Hit-ormiss translation may suffice, for example, in the mass media, but it is not
adequate when the life or death of an entire legal system is at stake.
Nowhere is the need for a precise translation more obvious than in the
Basic Law. Unfortunately, however, the English-language version of the
Basic Law simply does not carry the essence of the official Chinese-language version. For example, one cannot translate even the most basic,
most important concept, that of law itself, from Chinese into English,2
although the Chinese term falfi is commonly used to denote the "law."'
These differences are never discussed, and so the Basic Law has, I fear,
lulled many people into a false sense of security about the survivability of
the present legal system.
Thus, the entire process of analyzing and interpreting the Basic Law is
problematic and fraught with danger. The flaw contained in existing analyses is the assumption that Chinese and English terms are interchangeable.
The deception of current discourse lies in the failure of official pronouncements from both sides of the border to address the fragility of this assumption. As long as Chinese and Hong Kong government officials assume that
the words they use, such as law and constitution, have the same content or
referents in both legal languages, they perpetuate the myth that Hong
Kong's legal system will remain basically unchanged after 1997. For exam12. Liang Zhiping, Explicating "Law": A ComparativePerspectiveof Chinese and Western Legal Culture, 3 J. CHIqSE L 55, 89 (1989).

340
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pie, when the two sides declare in their own culture-specific languages that
Hong Kong's judiciary will be "independent," they appear to be in agreement. However, as demonstrated in Part II, the meaning of independent in
China differs radically from the meaning in Hong Kong and so use of this
word hides the differences. Hong Kong's six million people need and
deserve leaders who will engage in open and frank discussions about the
two systems' cultural, philosophical, political and legal differences. Without such a dialogue, the resolution of the dilemmas posed by the unique
challenges to Hong Kong's legal system will be a slow and painful process.
I do not expect the two governments to abandon their fundamental philosophies, but realpolitik requires each side to acknowledge and resolve the
issues raised in this Article.
II.

Demise of Judicial Powers

Part II addresses the central issue of judicial power in the Basic Law. It
compares essential elements of judicial authority, such as judicial independence, in the common law and Chinese civil law systems and then attempts
to resolve, to the extent possible, the inevitable conflicting meanings within
the context of the Basic Law and the HKSAR. In most instances, the conflicts cannot be resolved and the only outcome is a call for clarification or
amendment to the Basic Law. Part A describes judicial independence in
Hong Kong and China and then sets out the possible implications for the
HKSAR of the broad expanse separating the concept in Hong Kong and
China. Part B asks the basic, and yet unanswered, question of the legal
effect of the Basic Law. Is it a common law constitution, a Chinese civil
law "constitution" or an unwieldy amalgam of the two? Parts C, D and E
proceed with a review of several complicated, interlinking and, to this
author's mind, poorly drafted Basic Law provisions in an attempt to assess
the central question of this Article. The question is: which specific powers
of judicial review will be retained by the HKSAR judiciary after the
handover to Chinese sovereignty and which powers will be transferred out
of the common law system and into the hands of the Standing Committee?
The analysis reveals the impossibility of a definitive answer to the question,
but makes it abundantly clear that a significant transfer of judicial power
will occur unless the Basic Law is amended immediately.
A. Judicial Independence
This section highlights significant differences between the Hong Kong and
Chinese judiciaries and the implications of those differences for the
HKSAR judiciary, the Hong Kong legal system and the people of Hong
Kong. As demonstrated below, terms such as constitution, independence,
judiciary,judge, and judicial review are not translatable into Chinese even
though "equivalent" Chinese terms exist. The meanings of the commonlyused Chinese and English "equivalents" are so dissimilar that using them
is, at best, uninformative and, at worst, misleading.

1997

Lost in the Translation

1. Hong Kong's Independent Judiciary
The term independence of the judiciary is fraught with potential for misunderstanding and conflict because the very notion of a judiciary in China
diverges significantly from the meaning attached in Hong Kong. The common law definition of independence is straightforward and uncompromising. Judges are not beholden to the executive or the legislative branch, may
not become enmeshed in partisan politics, and do not take directions from
any person or institution when adjudicating cases. Judges of the highest
courts cannot be removed except for cause, and all judicial salaries are
fixed by law at a rate high enough to reduce the risk of corruption. Judges
may not adjudicate cases in which there may be, or could be perceived to
be, any conflict of interest. They must endeavor to remain engaged, yet
uninvolved, with the cases they adjudicate and must appear to act, and
indeed act, fairly and impartially in the exercise of their discretion. They
may neither meet with parties or their attorneys unless both sides are present nor comment publicly on a case in progress.
Trials are open to the public and jury verdicts and judicial decisions
are available for public scrutiny. Judges must render decisions in non-jury
and appellate cases in writing and apply proper legal reasoning for the
outcome. Judges have no power to decide matters that are not before them
in their official capacity or to apply the law in an arbitrary or irrational
manner. If a judge erroneously, arbitrarily or irrationally decides a case,
the system provides an appeal mechanism for reviewing and correcting
improper decisions. The institutional practices protecting the judiciary,
combined with these restraints on judicial behavior, ensure, to the greatest
extent possible, independence of the judiciary.
2.

China'sJudicial Organs and Non-Interference

The Chinese judiciary, although superficially similar to Hong Kong's, is
entirely different in form and function. It is the antithesis of Hong Kong's
independent judiciary, yet the Chinese also consider their "judges" to be
"independent." The Chinese term for independence is duli. However, a
yawning cultural gap separates China's "duli" judiciary from Hong Kong's
"independent!' one.
First, China does not have courts, in the Western sense. Instead, judicial organs within the civil service have responsibility for administering the
law. 13 Until recently, "judges" had civil service titles and were indistinguishable from bureaucrats in other administrative organs of the state. In
1995, the National People's Congress (NPC) adopted the Legal Official
(Faguan) Law, which separates the judiciary from the bureaucracy and
establishes a system for hiring, firing, classifying, evaluating and training
13. See generally Susan Finder, The Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of

China, 7 J. CHINFSE L 145, 148 (1993). "The [Supreme People's] Court is the highest
judicial organ of the state, not the highest court of the state." Id. The other judicial
organs are the people's procuratorate, the public security organ, the state security organ
and the judicial administration organ.
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judges. 14 However, while judges are no longer classified as bureaucrats,
they remain subordinate officials. Under the old system, judges were
called shenpanyuan (adjudication personnel) or fayuan ganbu (court cadres/officials),' 5 both of which accurately reflected the bureaucratic role of
the judiciary. They are now simply called faguan (legal officials), which
still reflects their subordinate civil servant status. Therefore, in order to
express the bureaucratic nature of China's judiciary, I use the more accurate terms adjudicatoryorgan instead of court and legal official instead of
judge.
Second, legal officials, even those on the Supreme People's Adjudicatory Organ, the highest adjudicatory organ, have no job security. 16 Even
though the Legal Official Law establishes fixed salaries, lower-level legal
officials are paid from local revenues, making them especially vulnerable to
pressure from local bureaucracies. Except for the Supreme People's Adjudicatory Organ, most legal officials have no, or minimal, legal training and
only a very few possess law degrees. Before 1995,
law school graduates, demobilized soldiers seeking a new profession, and
cadres of other state organs [made] up the bulk of potential judges. There
[was] no special training or test [to qualify for such position] ....

Their

salary is low; they have little social status, and in society as a whole, 17and
even within the legal profession, they do not play a "remarkable" role.
The quality of Legal Officials should improve over time as the Legal Official Law introduces an examination and evaluation system and intensive
short-term legal training for existing non-law trained legal officials.' 8 However, many years will pass before educated and legally-trained personnel
can fulfill the country's need for qualified staff: very few law graduates are
willing to join the judiciary unless forced to do so, and training of the
existing legal officials will take time.
Third, the judicial organ is not the sole state organ charged with exercising adjudicatory power. The Public Security Bureau can arrest, convict,
fine and/or sentence persons to a period of detention for various crimes
that, in the common law system, would be handled by the courts. 19
Fourth, although the Xianfa states that adjudicatory organs are
independent and "not subject to any interference by administrative organs,
14. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Faguanfa [Legal Official Law of the People's
Republic of China] (adopted Feb. 2, 1995), reprinted in I ZHONGHUA RENMEN
GONGHEGUO

FALO FAGUI [STATUTES AND REGULATIONS OF THE PEoPLE's REPUBLIC OF CHINA]

1-2-2-1.9 (1995) [hereinafter Legal Official Law].
15. Finder, supra note 13, at 175.

16.

XIANFA

[Constitution] art. 67, secs. 11, 124 (1982) (P.R.C.), translatedin I STAT.

uTEs AND REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S RmtULc OF CHINA

821204 (1987). The Legal

Official Law strengthens the position of legal personnel somewhat by establishing criteria for removal. However, the criteria are sufficiently broad and vague to support dismissal for almost any reason. Legal Official Law, supra note 14, arts. 8(3), 13.
17. Yang, supra note 8, at 28.

18. Legal Official Law, supra note 14, arts. 4(6), 9.
19. E.g., Regulations of the PRC on Security Administration and Punishment
(adopted Sept. 5, 1986), translated in ll STATUTES AND REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CmINA

860905 (1990).
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public organizations or individuals," 20 adjudicatory organs are not free
from the influence of the CCP, the NPC or the Standing Committee. 21
Despite recent legal reforms intended to bring about a rule of law system,
the CCP still maintains its control over the work of the adjudicatory organs.
As described by Qiao Shi, Secretary of the Central Political and Legal Commission of the CCP, "[b]asic court functions are to independently hear var22
ious cases within the legal framework and under the party's leadership."
Any, attempt by a legal official to claim independence from the CCP would
be tantamount to a counterrevolutionary act.
The CCP exercises supervision through a hierarchical structure, with
the CCP at the top dictating overall policy. The NPC and Standing Committee supervise the Supreme People's Adjudicatory Organ, 23 which, in
turn, supervises lower adjudicatory organs, which, in turn, supervise adjudicatory organs below them. 24 The Supreme People's Adjudicatory Organ
is directly responsible to the NPC and the Standing Committee, and the
lower adjudicatory organs are responsible to the organs of state power that
created them. The lack of judicial independence is further evident in the
fact that adjudicatory organs must submit annual work reports to the
supervisory organs. These reports describe the year's adjudicatory work
and plans for the next year. 25 Therefore, from the Chinese point of view,
the CCP, the NPC, the Standing Committee and the lower people's congresses do not interfere with the judicial process; they direct or guide the
adjudicatory organs, just as the Supreme People's Adjudicatory Organ
directs and guides the lower-level adjudicatory organs.
Nonetheless, even some Chinese scholars recognize that supervision
constitutes interference with adjudicatory independence. As one Chinese
commentator describes it: "[administrative] interference comes mainly
from two sources: One, the judicial committee and the leaders within the
court system ....
Two, leaders of certain administrative departments put
pressure on judges" in certain cases. 26 The author frankly concludes, "it is
20. XIAwA art. 126 (1982) (P.R.C.); Organic Law of the People's Courts of the Peo-

ple's Republic of China, adoptedJuly 1, 1979, art. 4, translatedin 2 LAws OF THE PEoPLE's

CHINA (1983-86), at 39 (1987) [hereinafter Adjudicatory Organ Organization Law]. See infra text and accompanying notes 56-67 for a discussion of the Xianfa.
21. Legal Official Law, supra note 14, art. 8(2) (only bars interference from administrative organs, social groups and individuals). The Standing Committee is the highest
organ under the NPC. It meets every two months while the NPC meets once a year. The
Standing Committee has, inter alia, power to make law, interpret the Xianfa and
national-level laws, and supervise state organs.
22. Liu Zhenying & Sun Benyao, XaNHUA (Beijing), Jan. 10, 1992, translated in
F.B.I.S.-CHI-92-008, Jan. 13, 1992, at 27-28 (emphasis added).
23. XrAunA art. 67, sec. 6 (1982) (P.thC.).
24. Id. art. 127.
25. For example, the 1991 Supreme People's Court Work Report reported on its
major accomplishments and set out goals for 1992, such as "attending to reform and
opening on the one hand and to cracking down on crimes on the other." Report on the
Work of the Supreme People's Court delivered by RenJianxin, President of the Supreme
People's Court at the Fifth Session of the Seventh NPC on Mar. 28, 1992, XNHUA, Apr. 6,
1992, translatedin F.B.I.S.-CHI-92-070-S, Apr. 10, 1992, at 8, 13-14.
26. Yang, supra note 8, at 28-29.
REPUBuC OF
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very difficult for [legal officials] to exercise independent judicial power and
even more difficult for them to have judicial freedom." 2 7 Although the
Legal Official Law now forbids administrative organs from exercising influence over legal officials, 28 enforcement will be difficult given the low status
of the adjudicatory organs and the tremendous power wielded by bureaucracies in China.
Judicial committees will continue to interfere with the work of adjudicatory organs through their exercise of adjudicatory powers. 29 Judicial
committees decide important or difficult cases collectively before trial and
the subordinate adjudicatory organs are bound to enforce the committee's
decisions. 30 Two legal officials of the Supreme People's Adjudicatory
Organ describe the committee's job thusly:
These committees, instead of trying cases directly, first discuss and then
make decisions on the most important or difficult cases handled by collegiate benches of judges. The collegiate benches are obliged to carry out
the decisions by the judicial committee .... The judicial committee exer-

cises collective leadership over the judicial activity within each people's
court. Members of the judicial committee are appointed or dismissed by the
standing committee
of the people's congress at the request of the president
31
of the court.

In ordinary cases that do not require direct decisionmaking by a judicial committee, "the court president or the chief judge of the relevant division of the court" and, in certain situations the judicial committee, must,
nonetheless, pre-approve the decision. 3 2 Adjudicatory organs at the lower
levels, where almost all cases are heard, have very little judicial-type power.
They are limited to administering law as received and are not empowered
to interpret the law or question its appropriateness. 33 Thus, China's civil
law courts, neither have the institutional independence of European civil
law courts nor the individual independence of judges in common law
courts.
Fifth, legal officials are not expected to, and do not, remain independent from the pre-trial process or from the parties or lawyers involved in
cases before them. In criminal and civil cases, legal officials are authorized
27. Id. at 29.
28. Legal Official Law, supra note 14, art 8(2).
29. Adjudicatory Organ Organization Law, supra note 20, art. 11 (function is "to

sum up judicial experience and to discuss important or difficult cases and other issues
relating to the judicial work").
30. Id.; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingshi Susongfa [Criminal Procedure Law
of the People's Republic of China], adopted March 17, 1996, art. 149, reprinted in
RaeAEN FAYUAN BAO [PEOPLE'S LEGAL DAILY], Mar. 26, 1996, at 1, col. 1 [hereinafter
Criminal Procedure Law].
31. Zhang Min & Shan Changzong, Inside China's Court System, BEJING REv., Nov. 511, 1990, at 15, 17.
32. ALBERT HUNG-YEE
REPUBLIC OF CHINA

CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYsTEm OF THE PEOPLE'S

120 (1992). The judicial committee decides even quite simple cases.

I attended the trial of a simple assault case that the legal officials turned over to the
judicial committee.
33. However, see infra note 97 and accompanying text.
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to conduct their own investigations and to discuss cases with parties, witnesses and/or counsel for one side without the presence of representatives
from the other side. 3 4 According to the more constrained Chinese definitions of independent and impartial, the legal officials are engaging in
mutual assistance that does not interfere with their ability to render impartial decisions. Not surprisingly, legal officials' ability to meet with parties
can easily lead to corrupt practices. To offset their low salaries and
increase their prestige, many legal officials long ago abandoned any
attempt to act impartially. Instead, they often require parties to hold lavish
banquets for them before the trial begins. 35 The problem is so serious that
the Legal Official Law specifically outlaws accepting gifts or attending
36
banquets.
Duli, therefore, does not mean independence from the executive or legislative branches or from the CCP; neither does it mean impartiality, in the
common law sense. It simply means the ability to adjudicate within the
parameters set by the supervisory organs. It amounts to little more than
investigating, hearing testimony,3 7 and mechanically applying (but rarely
questioning) a pre-determined outcome.
3.

The HKSAR Judiciary

The Basic Law appears to ensure the continued independence of the
HKSAR judiciary. It contains an assurance that "[tihe courts of the
[HKSAR] shall exercise judicial power independently, free from any interference." 38 Specific provisions support an independent judiciary through
judicial immunity from lawsuits, 3 9 merit-based judicial appointments by
the Chief Executive upon the recommendation of an independent commission,40 judicial removal only for cause, 4 1 and no changes in seniority or
34. Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 30, art. 43; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo

Minshi Susongfa [Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China], adopted Apr.
9, 1991, arts. 64-65, translated in 5 CHINA LAw AND PRACTICE 15 (June 17, 1991). 1 was
once present when the attorney for the defendant met a legal official both before and
after the trial to discuss the case and make small talk. We were the only persons present
in the room.
35. For example, while teaching in northern China, I asked a student about her experience working for a law firm over the summer. She replied that she had never eaten so
many bear paws (i.e., attended so many banquets) in her life. The banquets had been
hosted by the firm's clients for adjudication personnel before trial. Litigants failing to
hold banquets experienced delays and possible adverse outcomes.
36. Legal Official Law, supra note 14, art. 30(12).
37. The 1996 revised Criminal Procedure Law adopted, for the first time, the principle of presumption of innocence, or at least the lack of presumption of guilt, before trial.
Criminal Procedure Law, supra note 30, art. 12 ("Until the court reaches a decision, no
one may be determined to be guilty."). Presumably, if the defendant's guilt or innocence
can only be determined during trial, then legal officials will play a greater role in hearing
and determining evidence. The new law will have no impact upon the quasi-judicial
roles of the CCP and the judicial committees.
38. Basic Law, supra note 1, art. 85.
39. Id.
40. Id. arts. 88, 92.
41. Id. art. 89.
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pay.4 2 Unfortunately, the promises cannot, by themselves, ensure preservation of a truly independent judiciary until Hong Kong and China reconcile the meanings of the words independent and duli.
The wide gulf separating the common law and Chinese interpretations
of the phrase judicial independence can only have an adverse impact upon
the HKSAR judiciary. The gulf will be revealed in the day-to-day work of
the judiciary as cases are adjudicated and laws interpreted. First, as discussed in greater detail later, 43 the judiciary will be forced to share much
of its present power with the Standing Committee. Second, ambiguous,
poorly drafted language in the Basic Law will cause tremendous difficulties
for the judiciary as it will force judges to ask a new non-common-law question-how exactly does this provision affect the court's competence and
jurisdiction?
Chinese legal experts have difficulty, however, understanding how the
division of power between the courts and the Standing Committee will
affect judicial independence. For example, Wu Jianfan, an influential legal
advisor to the Chinese government on Hong Kong, 4 4 believes Hong Kong
people have no reason to fear Standing Committee interference with
HKSAR judicial powers because the Standing Committee will only have
power to interpret the Basic Law's meaning in certain areas and will not
itself apply the law.45 Another Chinese scholar, Zheng Yi, also confines the
meaning ofjudicial independence to freedom from interference in deciding
the outcome of cases. 46 Neither Wu nor Zheng recognizes that transfer to
the Standing Committee of judicial power to interpret the law means the
loss of common law judicial independence.
In the view of these mainland writers, the HKSAR courts will be
independent because, even though they will have to share their powers with
the Standing Committee, they will be free to decide how to apply laws in all
cases and how to interpretthe Basic Law in many or most cases. From the
Chinese perspective, this position is unassailable, as the HKSAR courts will
exercise more power than do China's adjudicatory organs and will theoretically be free from CCP and central government control. However, Wu's
42. Id. art. 93.
43. See discussion infra Part II.C.
44. Wu is a member of the Basic Law Drafting Committee, the Preliminary Working

Committee and the Preparatory Committee. The last two committees advise the Chinese
government on transitional issues. The Preparatory Committee was established by the
Standing Committee in accordance with the Decision of the National People's Congress
on the Method for the Formation of the First Government and the First Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, adopted Apr. 4, 1990. It is com-

posed of Hong Kong and mainland Chinese representatives. The Preliminary Working
Committee operated prior to the formation of the Preparatory Committee.
45. Wu Jianfan, 'Tiguo Liangzhi" de Falh Baozheng-Tan Zhongyang yu Xianggang
Tebie Xingzhengqu de Guanxi [A Law SafeguardingOne Country, Two Systems: A Discussion Concerning the Relationship Between the Central Government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region], 13 ZHONGGUO FALO KEXUE [CHNA L. Sci.] 15, 19-20 (1990).
46. Zheng Yi, Xianggong Tebie Xingzhengqu de Sifa Tizhi [The Judicial System of the

Hong Kong Special Administrative Region], in YIGuo LLANGZHI YU
ZHmu [ONE CouNTRY,Two SySrEMS AND HONG KONG'S BAsic LAw

XIANGGONG JIBENALO
SYSTEM]

(Xiao Weiyun ed., 1990) [hereinafter ONE CoutnrY,Two SYSTEMS].

299, 310-311
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and Zheng's statements are particularly worrisome because they come
from Chinese legal scholars who claim to understand Hong Kong's legal
system and whose opinions (especially Wu's) about China's Hong Kong
policy are influential. Yet, neither scholar is capable of analyzing the
HKSAR judiciary on its own terms. Each of them perceives it through the
lens of the Chinese legal system and fails to recognize that the Chinese
definition of independence is entirely inconsistent with common law tradition. They are apparently ignorant of the fact that common law courts
interpret for many reasons, not just for the purpose of determining whether
a law is appropriate in a particular case and how it should be applied to the
parties.
The struggle over the definition of independence came to the fore in the
heated debate about the composition of the Court of Final Appeal (CFA),
which will be the HKSAR's highest court. The Basic Law permits "judges
from other common law jurisdictions" to sit on the CFA but is silent as to
the number who can sit at any one time. 47 People in Hong Kong welcome
this silence because it allows for the flexibility, which they consider essential, to protect the independence of the judiciary and to retain investors'
confidence in the legal system. Unfortunately, the Chinese and British governments eliminated this flexibility in a secret deal to permit only one
judge from abroad to sit on the CFA. When the Hong Kong Governor
presented the Legislative Council (Legco) with a CFA bill containing a provision providing for only one non-local judge, the legal community, legislators and the public were outraged by the terms of the secret deal.
Nonetheless, Legco was forced, as a practical matter, to capitulate to the
terms of the secret deal because the Chinese are adamantly opposed to any
other formula. No other version would have received the governor's
48
approval and Legco has no power to override the governor's action.
Legco had no choice but to pass the bill.
The demand to restrict foreign judges came in response to China's
recent realization that independence of the judiciary in the common law
context does not mean duli. Not only do Chinese officials consider the
presence of even one expatriate judge on the CFA to represent the continuation of colonial influence, but they also fear that a truly independent CFA
would itself constitute a threat to China's sovereignty over the HKSAR.
China believes it has already conceded an enormous amount of sovereignty
over HKSAR affairs by permitting the HKSAR to have its own final court of
appeals and by agreeing to the presence of even one expatriate judge. To
the Chinese, these concessions alone mean the region's judiciary will be
more "independent" than any other judicial organ in China. From the
Hong Kong perspective, however, there is no consolation in the knowledge
that the present independent judiciary will remain more independent than
the Chinese adjudicatory organs when it will also become less independent
47. Basic Law, supra note 1, art. 82.
48. Hong Kong Letters Patent, app. 1 (1991) (L.N. 201/91), arts. X, XI [hereinafter
Letters Patent].
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than it is now. China sees a glass half full; Hong Kong sees a glass half
empty.
The struggle over the definition of the term independent judiciary is
brought into even sharper focus in the following analyses of the Basic Law
and its potential impact on judicial review, final adjudication and case law.
These are all potential flashpoints that will, if not resolved soon, surely
lead to misunderstandings and friction after 1997. The outcome could
alter the nature of the judiciary in significant and, often, unexpected ways.
B. The Status of the Basic Law
One area in which the differences between the Chinese and Hong Kong
views are submerged in language is in discussions concerning the legal
status of the Basic Law. The resolution of these differences will directly
affect the post-1997 level of judicial independence. The most basic issue,
the status of the Basic Law, is still unresolved. The Basic Law will be the
highest law in the HKSAR. However, the Chinese and British Hong Kong
governments have yet to clarify the ambiguous status of this socialist civil
law document within the common law context. Each side defines the Basic
Law in the terms with which it is most familiar, assuming that the other
side is using the same point of reference and the same legal vocabulary.
Hong Kong legal experts and politicians refer to the Basic Law as the
HKSAR's "mini-constitution." 49 The Chinese categorize the Basic Law as a
fangzhen or fangzhen zhengce (basic indicator policy).50 The difference
between the two interpretations is never brought to the foreground for clarification and the consequences are far from being merely academic. At
stake is the very nature of the Basic Law-hence the nature of Hong Kong's
post-1997 legal system.
1. Hong Kong's Common Law Constitution
From the Hong Kong perspective, the territory's highest law is properly a
constitution. Hong Kong's colonial constitution sets out the form of government in the colony, the powers of the three branches of government and
the relationship between the Hong Kong and British governments. It is
found in the Letters Patent, the Royal Instructions, an abstract constitution
consisting of laws and instruments having constitutional effect, and
unwritten practices or conventions that limit or direct the manner in which
the government exercises its power. 5 1 The conventions are especially
49. See, e.g., Trevor M. Morris, Some Problems Regarding the Power of Constitutional
Interpretationunder Article 158 of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, 21 H.K

J. 87, 87 (1991).

50. See, e.g., Xiao Weiyun, The Relationship between the Constitution of the People's
Republic of China and the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, in
ONE CouNTy, Two SYsTEMs, supra note 46, at 109.
51. Letters Patent, supra note 48; Hong Kong Royal Instructions, app. 1 (1991) (L.N.
202/91) [hereinafter Royal Instructions]. See PErER WESLEY-SMrru, I CONSTrrtIrONAI &
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN HONG KONG

MENT AND PoLrrcs OF HONG KONG

4-7, 56-81 (1987); NoRMAN

54-63 (5th ed. 1991).
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important as "they are the political ethics of the constitution."5 2 Deviations from the written or abstract portions of the constitution are rare
because common law constitutional principles are deeply ingrained in the
Hong Kong legal and political establishment.
The non-administrative portions of the constitution are directly
enforceable in court. 5 3 However, courts have rarely been called upon to
exercise their judicial review powers because the constitution is primarily
concerned with the operation of government and does not contain any
rights provisions. Hong Kong does have a Bill of Rights Ordinance
(BRO) 5 4 though, which, although technically an ordinary piece of legislation, is similar in effect to a constitutional bill of rights. Until midnight
June 30, 1997, it is enforceable in court against all laws, even future laws,
and against the government, 5 5 but it is inapplicable in the private sector.
2.

China's Xianfa

The Xianfa5 6 is China's highest law and, accordingly, is translated into
English as "constitution." The Xianfa is structurally similar to a common
law constitution in that it establishes branches of government, regulates
the relationship between different branches of government and sets out the
relationship between the public and the government.5 7 However, it is fundamentally distinguishable from Hong Kong's constitution because it is
merely a "semantic" constitution,5 8 "seems to bear no relation to the actual
government of China,"'59 and is overtly political. A semantic constitution
has no independent legal authority; it is a programmatic set of policies that
60
may be codified into domestic legislation over time as conditions permit.
Provisions, such as the rights (more accurately, privileges) of speech,
press, assembly, association, etc., 6 1 become law only when given effect
through national legislation.62 In the absence of national legislation,
rights (privileges) do not exist. In one respect the Xianfa does have some
legal effect: if a conflict exists between the Xianfa and certain other laws,
the Standing Committee can declare the other law "unconstitutional,"
hence invalid.6 3 This should not be confused with common law judicial
52. WESLEY-SMITH, supra note 51, at 7. It is possible that the conventions will disappear in 1997 along with the Letters Patent and Royal Instructions.
53. Id. at 11, 68-69.
54. Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, No. 59 (1991) (H.K.) [hereinafter Bill of
Rights Ordinance].

55. See infra text accompanying notes 87-90.
56. Xian is translated as "constitution" or "statute" and fa as "law." Pronounced
"shee-ann fah."

57. XLANFA arts. 2, 3, 57-133 (1982) (P.R.C.).
58. CHEN, supra note 32, at 41.
59. William C.Jones, The Constitutionof the People's Republic of China, 63 WASH. U.
L.Q. 707, 710 (1985).
60. See CHEN, supra note 58, at 46.
61. XIA-,A ch. 11 (1982) (P.R.C.).
62. See Chen, supra note 58, at 46.
63. XLANUA art. 67, secs. 7, 8 (1982) (P.R.C.).
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review in which a litigant can argue that application of a particular law to
her or him is unconstitutional.
Next, real political power is held by the CCP, not the officials and
institutions stipulated in the Xianfa. For example, until several years before
his death, Deng Xiaoping controlled the CCP, and hence the government,
even though he had not held any official government post for a number of
years. Lastly, the Xianfa is similar to the Soviet-style constitution "in the
64
presence of ideological statements and the prominence of economics."
The most important function of all xianfa, argues Professor Jones, is their
political function: "the adoption of a constitution is a signal that a significant change has taken place in the government or in society, and that it is
conceived to be long-lasting"65 and "tend[s] to show the direction that their
promulgators plan to take in governing China." 6 6 For example, the NPC
promulgated the 1982 Xianfa to confirm that the political, social and economic transformations to a socialist-market economy, which commenced
67
in 1979, would be long-lasting.
In brief, the Xianfa is not law, in the common law sense. It stands in
stark contrast to Hong Kong's common law (albeit colonial) constitution;
therefore, it is fundamentally inappropriate and misleading to apply the
English term constitution to China's Xianfa. The differences between Hong
Kong's colonial constitution and China's Xianfa are so vast that even the
term Chinese-style constitution is misleading. For this reason, I use the Chinese term Xianfa to avoid the natural tendency of English speakers familiar
with common law constitutions to associate the Chinese Xianfa with a
common law constitution.
3. The HKSAR's Basic Law
The Basic Law poses a special problem for the common law scholar as no
neat common law constitutional category exists into which it fits. It is the
domestic codification of an international agreement adopted by a socialist
civil law legislature for application in a capitalist common law society.
Hong Kong people assume it is a constitution. The Chinese government
rejects that view and considers it to be a political document that expresses
68
its Hong Kong policy.
When Hong Kong people categorize the Basic Law as a "mini-constitution," they assume that the Basic Law will step into the legal vacuum created by the disappearance of the colonial constitution. They envision a
constitution that litigants can, at least in part, invoke. In their view, the
Basic Law is two-dimensional: its policy/administrative portions are not
directly enforceable in court, while the rest of it is. For example, the public
64. Jones, supra note 59, at 707.
65. Id. at 712.
66. Id. at 713.

67. XiwFA arts. 11 ("the individual economy of urban and rural working people...
is a complement to the Socialist public economy."), 18 ("[floreign enterprises ... and
individual foreigners [can] invest in China.") (1982) (P.R.C.).
68. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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expects courts to give the rights stipulated in the Basic Law the same force
and effect as the rights contained in the BRO. The judiciary expects to
remain competent to repeal legislation and to modify or overturn common
law and rules of equity that do not conform with the Basic Law. It also
expects to retain its ability to refer to international and common law precedents and principles. 69 The mini-constitution position finds further support in the fact that the Basic Law will be applied in a common law
jurisdiction; therefore, common law rules of interpretation should prevail.
According to this position, the Basic Law will have constitutional status
within the HKSAR, notwithstanding its being a Chinese national law,
because it will be the region's highest law.
This argument, however, leaves the Chinese at the border. China's
views on the Basic Law cannot be dismissed as wrong simply because they
are inconsistent with the common law position. After all, China alone is
responsible for implementing the Joint Declaration in Hong Kong and the
Basic Law is the instrument by which China will fulfill its international
obligations. Obviously, China must meet its international law obligations.
However, given the general language of the Joint Declaration, the nature of
those obligations is open to debate. As stated at the outset, the Joint Declaration is intended to preserve Hong Kong's existing capitalist system and
way of life. Therefore, ambiguities should be resolved in a manner consistent with the common law system wherever possible. Nonetheless, while it
is proper to argue that the Basic Law is a mini-constitution, prudence dictates a more realistic approach that recognizes the fragile status of the post1997 common law in the Basic Law. The Basic Law's mixture of socialist
civil law language with common law language requires common law practitioners to become well-acquainted with the Chinese perspective and the
Chinese legal system. They also must recognize that compromise will be a
necessary component in the re-creation of the legal system.
In the Chinese legal hierarchy, the Basic Law is merely another, albeit
special, national-level law. It is not a mini-constitution, as China is a unitary state having only one constitution. Unlike the United States, China is
not a federation and does not permit local autonomous governments to
enact local constitutions. Although the HKSAR will have more autonomy
than any other region in China, it will not be a province or a state. Rather,
70
it will be an administrative region.
[Ain S.A.R. [Special Administrative Region] is not just an economic unit distinct from the rest of the country. It is a localized political-legal entity and a
socio-economic reality differentiated from the general socialist system but
forming part of a unitary state ....[This] implies that the two systems are
not equal since the basic norm of the new order will be located within the
69. On the other hand, Article 107, which requires the HKSAR to "follow the principle of keeping expenditure within the limits of revenues," Basic Law, supra note 1, art.
107, is an administrative directive, which private parties certainly will not have the ability to invoke against the HKSAR government. These provisions alone do not prevent the
Basic Law from being a constitution as the Royal Instructions, which is part of Hong
Kong's colonial constitution, contains similar unenforceable provisions.
70. Xianfa art. 31 (1982) (P.R.C.).
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P.R.C.'s socialist system which article I of the P.R.C. Constitution uncompromisingly1 declares to be "the basic system of the People's Republic of
7
China."
From the Chinese perspective, the Basic Law is a non-enforceable
statement of policy and an administrative directive from the central government to a regional subunit. It gives expression to China's Hong Kong
fangzhen zhengce,7 2 translated as "basic policies." As Chang points out, the
English translation has "de-ideologized" the real meaning, which is politically charged. 73 A more accurate translation offangzhen zhengce is "direction indicator policy." Fangzhen (which means "direction indicator")
"prescribes the course of the task to be undertaken and regulates those
aspects of the work which are perceived to be in dialectical relationship," 74
and zhengce (which means "policy") "refers to the actual measures and procedures laid down by the C.C.P. to realize its political objectives." 75
According to its Preamble, the Basic Law "prescrib[es] the systems to be
practised in the [HKSAR], in order to ensure the implementation of the basic
policies [fangzhen zhengce] of the People's Republic of China regarding
76
Hong Kong."
In addition to implementing the Joint Declaration, the Basic Law is the
concrete expression of China's "one country, two systems" policy. The policy was first enunciated in the Joint Declaration as a means to permit Hong
Kong to rejoin the Mainland while retaining its existing economic, political,
legal, and social institutions. The Basic Law is a tool for implementing the
policy and for regulating the contradictions between Hong Kong's capitalist common law system and China's socialist civil law system as well as
other contradictions inherent in the "one country, two systems" policy. Its
basic practical function is to direct the HKSAR government in the administration of the HKSAR's social, political, economic and legal institutions in a
manner that is distinct from the administration of similar institutions on
the Mainland.
The Chinese drafters charged with the task of implementing the "one
country, two systems" policy through the Basic Law may have intended the
entire Basic Law to be programmatic and administrative. Given their unfamiliarity with Western constitutions, they may not even have thought about
the question of whether or not the Basic Law is "law." They also may not
have realized that contradictions exist between China's system of legislative
review and the common law system of judicial review 77 because they misunderstood judicial review and so simply assumed the primacy of legislative review. Consequently, they gave the primary review powers to the
Standing Committee.
71. Chang, supra note 6, at 107-08 (footnote omitted).
72. Pronounced "fong-jen jeng-tse."
73. Chang, supra note 6, at 101.

74. Id. at 102.
75. Id. at 103.
76. Basic Law, supra note 1, preamble (emphasis added).
77. See infra discussion accompanying notes 83-97.
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Some Basic Law provisions could be interpreted to support the Chinese view that the Basic Law is a set of policies and not an enforceable
common law constitution. For example, the Basic Law does not state
explicitly that private citizens can ask courts to enforce any of its provisions. Indeed, several Basic Law rights provisions imply the opposite. The
Basic Law, as well as the Joint Declaration and the Xianfa, contain wording
such as rights are "protected by law," or "safeguarded by the laws."7 8 In
the Chinese context, these phrases mean that the legislature must implement the provisions in order for the enumerated rights to have legal effect.
Without legislation, they are simply statements of policy. In fact, all Xianfa
rights, with or without such language, need legislation to be effective. Consequently, it is probable that China considers the Basic Law provisions
containing such language, if not all Basic Law rights' provisions, to be similar to Xianfa provisions, i.e., programmatic and unenforceable in the
absence of legislation.
On the other hand, the Basic Law also supports the common law view
that it is an enforceable constitution. At least some of the provisions must
have legal effect because Article 158 empowers the Standing Committee to
"interpret" the Basic Law and to delegate some of that power to the courts:
The power of interpretation of this Law shall be vested in the Standing Committee ....The Standing Committee... shall authorize the courts of the
[HKSAR] to interpret on their own, in adjudicating cases, the provisions of
this Law which are within the limits of the autonomy of the Region.
The courts of the [HKSAR] may also interpret other provisions of this Law in
adjudicating cases. However, if the courts of the Region, in adjudicating
cases, need to interpret the provisions of this Law concerning affairs which
are the responsibility of the Central People's Government, or concerning the
relationship between the Central Authorities and the Region, and if such
interpretation will affect the judgments on the cases, the courts of the Region
shall, before making their final judgments which are not appealable, seek an
interpretation of the relevant provisions from the Standing Committee...
through the Court of Final appeal of the Region. When the Standing Committee makes an interpretation of the provisions concerned, the courts of the
Region, in applying those provisions, shall follow the interpretation of the
Standing79Committee. However, judgments previously rendered shall not be
affected.
The only reason courts will interpret the Basic Law under this Article
will be to determine how to apply the Basic Law provisions in adjudicating
concrete cases. Thus, logic dictates that Article 158 means that the Basic
Law is, to some extent, legally enforceable. The principle of interpreting
ambiguous provisions in favor of preserving the common law also dictates
the same conclusion, as directly enforceable constitutions are part and parcel of Hong Kong's common law tradition.
78. E.g., XIANA arts. 40, 41 (1982) (P.R.C.); Basic Law, supra note 1, arts. 36, 39, 41;
Joint Declaration, supra note 2, art. 3(5).

79. Basic Law, supra note 1, art. 158. The Standing Committee has yet to issue such
authorization.
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C. Interpretation and Judicial Review in the Basic Law
Unfortunately, Article 158 does not provide any clue as to which Basic Law
provisions will have legal effect or the purpose for which courts and the
Standing Committee will be able to interpret those provisions. Instead, it
leaves considerable room for disagreement. China's purpose in drafting
the Basic Law was to solve the contradictions inherent in the "one country,
two systems" policy, but the Basic Law falls short of the mark. For
instance, the Basic Law does not resolve the contradiction between the
common law rule that judges alone interpret the constitution and the
socialist civil law rule that the legislature alone interprets the Xianfa. Nor
does it resolve the contradiction between common law's directly enforceable constitutions and socialist civil law's programmatic xianfa.
One interpretation of Article 158 is that it confers all common law
powers of interpretation on the courts. Common law courts generally
interpret constitutions for the purpose of (a) determining which provisions
have legal effect, (b) judicially reviewing ordinances and legislation, (c)
judicially reviewing acts or omissions of government officials, and/or (d)
determining how to apply a provision directly to litigants.80 The discussion below addresses the question of whether or not all four forms of interpretation will remain unchanged and concludes that the Basic Law
significantly diminishes the common law meaning of judicial
interpretation.
1. Legal Effect of the Basic Law
It is not possible to determine which provisions may or will be legally effective. The more important question at this point is which body-the HKSAR
judiciary or the Standing Committee-is authorized by Article 158 to interpret the Basic Law to determine which, if any, provisions are directly
enforceable. Four possible answers exist: the courts, the Standing Committee, the two bodies with divided responsibilities, or no response. The
Article addresses each alternative in turn.
First, it is highly unlikely that China will allow the HKSAR courts to
continue exercising monopoly powers of interpretation. Articles 17, 158
and 160, discussed below in detail, transfer considerable judicial powers of
interpretation to the Standing Committee. Therefore, unless the NPC
amends the Basic Law, Article 158 most likely will not confer monopoly
power on the courts to determine which provisions, if any, are directly
enforceable.
80. Further complicating the issue is the question of how the HKSAR judiciary has
competence to decide whether or not a particular Basic Law provision is within its own
or Standing Committee jurisdiction when the question itself is a matter "concerning the
relationship between the Central Authorities and the Region." Basic Law, supra note 1,
art. 158. If, as indicated in Article 158, it is up to the courts to refer Basic Law provisions to the Standing Committee, then the courts are put in the anomalous position, out
of necessity, of having to decide whether a particular Basic Law provision is a matter for
HKSAR courts or the Standing Committee. This means they must interpret all Basic Law
provisions in the first instance, not just the ones circumscribed by Article 158. For
more on this conundrum, see generally Morris, supra note 49.
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Second, the Chinese could argue that the Basic Law itself regulates the
relationship between the central government and the HKSAR. Under this
argument, if Article 158 dictates that the Standing Committee alone has the
power to interpret the Basic Law on issues involving local-central relations,
then the Standing Committee alone has the power to determine which
Basic Law provisions are directly enforceable.
If China accepts (as it should) that some provisions of the Basic Law
are directly enforceable, but insists that only the Standing Committee can
decide which ones, then courts will neither know, nor have the power to
determine, which provisions litigants can invoke in court. Every time a
party presents a new Basic Law provision for enforcement, the presiding
judge will have to refer the issue of direct enforceability to the Standing
Committee, which will then consult with the Committee for the Basic Law
(which has yet to be established), as required by Article 158. The Basic
Law Committee will then meet, discuss and submit its views to the Standing Committee, which will consider the Committee's views and issue a
response to the court. In the interim, the court (and litigants) will have no
alternative but to wait for the Standing Committee's reply.
Once the Standing Committee rules that a provision has legal effect,
courts will only have power to interpret and apply that provision in concrete cases. This is an unacceptable result and would constitute a serious
breach of China's promise to permit Hong Kong to retain a high degree of
autonomy. If China insists that Article 158 transfers all power to determine the direct enforceability of the Basic Law to the Standing Committee,
it will strip Hong Kong of its present total autonomy in judicial matters.
Third, the Basic Law could be interpreted to divide power between the
Standing Committee and the courts, according to the separate delegation
of powers in Article 158. The courts could decide whether the Basic Law
provisions within their scope of authority were directly enforceable, and
the Standing Committee could do likewise for the provisions within its
scope of authority. In order to make this arrangement explicit, the Standing Committee could approve it in writing. Article 158 requires the Standing Committee to authorize the HKSAR courts to interpret the Basic Law.
The Standing Committee could include appropriate language in this
authorization. While this is not an ideal solution, it would at least leave
courts with many, although not all, of their present powers to interpret the
enforceability of Hong Kong's constitution. Such an arrangement would
also restore some confidence in the HKSAR and demonstrate China's intention to honor its commitment to allow Hong Kong to exercise a "high
degree of autonomy." 8 1
Fourth, the most likely scenario is one in which China takes no position at the outset. As a result, the first time a litigant attempts to invoke the
Basic Law in an HKSAR court, the judge will have to decide the meaning of
the word interpret in Article 158. The judge may apply common law principles and assume that Article 158 preserves the pre-1997 power of the
81. Joint Declaration, supra note 2, art. 3, sec. 2.
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courts to interpret the HKSAR's highest law. In so doing, the court will
assume, in the first instance, that interpretation of Article 158 is within the
court's powers, i.e., that Article 158 does not implicate the relationship
between the central authorities and the HKSAR, and, thus, the Standing
Committee need not interpret it. It will assume, in the second instance,
that the word interpretgives HKSAR courts power to determine which Basic
Law provisions have legal effect. The court's assumption of a power to
interpret law would be justified because judicial exercise of such power is
in complete accord with existing common law principles and practices.
This solution, although consistent with the common law system and
with China's promises in the Joint Declaration, is unsatisfactory because,
more than likely, the court's assumption of power would last only as long
as the Chinese government does not feel threatened by the court's decisions. China could, and probably would, step in to object if courts began
to declare provisions, especially the rights provisions, directly enforceable.
Some lawyers and legal scholars in Hong Kong have expressed to this
author a preference for the fourth alternative because they do not believe
the Chinese will step in once the court assumes power. However, this alternative requires that the first judge to hear such a case be totally committed
to judicial review and able to withstand political pressure and Chinese
approbation. Unfortunately, Hong Kong's judiciary is quite conservative
and, until the recent passage of the BRO, has had little experience with
judicial review. Most of its members are more familiar and comfortable
with the British system in which Parliament is supreme than they are with
playing the role of enforcer of rights. It is unrealistic to expect one judge,
or even several judges sitting on the highest court, to solve what is essentially a political problem-that of the distribution of power between the
regional judiciary and the central legislative authority.8 2 Those who advocate that courts in a state-controlled special administrative region should
determine the scope of judicial power must assume that, first, the Chinese
will accept a truly independent judiciary and, second, HKSAR judges are
prepared to render controversial decisions that may lead to confrontations
with the sovereign power. I do not assume that either set of facts will exist.
Rather, I suspect that, if China does not somehow clarify the meaning of
Article 158 by July 1, 1997, judges will take very conservative positions to
avoid confrontation with China. They will thus voluntarily curtail their
own judicial powers.
2. Judicial Review of Law

Assuming that at least some Basic Law provisions are directly enforceable,
the next question is whether Article 158 authorizes the HKSAR courts to
interpret the Basic Law for the purpose of determining whether any laws
are unconstitutional, and hence unenforceable.
82. The HKSAR Court of Final Appeals will not be in a position comparable to the
U.S. Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). That case
involved a struggle for review power between two co-equal branches of government,
which struggle the judiciary won.
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a. Judicial Review in Hong Kong
Hong Kong courts presently have judicial review power to "declare void
and inoperative an ordinance or part of an ordinance on the ground that it
is repugnant to an Act of Parliament" 8 3 or to the Letters Patent.8 4 The more
detailed Royal Instructions are "partly administrative in nature, though
most clauses are clearly legislative and . . . in general, . . . have legal
effect."8 5 Thus, courts can also strike down laws they determine to be
repugnant to the legislative portions of the Royal Instructions. The Crown
has no power to determine any law's constitutionality. Legco adopts a bill,
the governor signs it, the Crown gives its "assent," and the bill becomes
law.8 6 Rarely has the Crown refused to give its assent. Assent simply
means that the bill becomes law; it does not include any determination by
the Crown on the constitutionalityof the bill, which is left for the courts to
decide.
The scope of the courts' judicial review was expanded recently with
the passage of the Bill of Rights Ordinance (BRO). 8 7 Although the BRO is a
piece of ordinary legislation, it has been given constitutional effect. Two
provisions in the BRO give courts power to declare void part or all of any
pre-BRO ordinance or subsidiary legislation that the courts are unable to
interpret in a manner consistent with the BRO. 88 A provision added to the
Letters Patent gives courts power to void post-BRO laws for failure to comply with the BRO. 8 9 Together, these two sets of provisions give the BRO
quasi-constitutional status at least until midnight June 30, 1997, when the
Letters Patent lapses. 90
b.

Legislative Review of Law in China

Officially, judicial review does not exist in China, as exclusive power to
interpret the Xianfa is delegated to the Standing Committee. 9 1 The Standof
ing Committee can only interpret the Xianfa for the limited purpose
92
It
determining whether it should declare a law invalid for repugnance.
has never exercised this power because national laws adopted by the NPC
93
Apparor the Standing Committee are presumptively constitutional.
83. MINmS, supra note 51, at 58-59.
84. WESLEY-SMrrH, supra note 51, at 11.

85. Id. at 68-69.
86. Letters Patent, supra note 48, art. XI.

87. Bill of Rights Ordinance, supra note 54.
88. Id. arts. 3, 4.
89. Letters Patent, supra note 48, art. VII, sec. 3.
90. The Hong Kong government and others have taken the somewhat disingenuous
position that the BRO does not have a higher status than other ordinances. However, the
sole reason the BRO is an ordinance rather than a part of Hong Kong's constitution is
that the Letters Patent and Royal Instructions cease to exist at midnight June 30, 1997.
91. XIAwA art. 67, sec. 1 (1982) (P.thC.).
92. Id. art. 5, art. 67, sec. 1.
93. The NPC enacted the Xianfa and the NPC and Standing Committee enact statelevel laws. If the Standing Committee were to rule that a state-level law is unconstitutional, it would be ruling that a law passed by itself or the NPC is unconstitutional. It is

illogical to assume that the body that either enacted the Xianfa or interprets the Xianfa
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ently, ministry and bureau rules and regulations are also presumptively
constitutional as the Standing Committee has never challenged any of them
either. Furthermore, the Standing Committee has not delegated its power
to interpret the Xianfa to any other body, not even the Supreme People's
Adjudicatory Organ, to whom it has delegated power to interpret certain
other laws.9 4 Additionally, judicial review is a theoretical and factual

impossibility because the adjudicatory branch is not a co-equal branch of
government. 95 The Supreme People's Adjudicatory Organ is inferior to the
executive and legislative branches, and thus it could never have the right to
sit in judgment on the legality of laws passed by the NPC.
Virtually all legal scholars accept that Chinese adjudicatory organs
never exercise any power of judicial review.9 6 Nonetheless, one scholar
suggests that lower-level adjudicatory organs can indirectly review local,
but not national, laws. Liu Nanping cites the following example in a
Supreme People's Adjudicatory Organ Notice to a lower-level adjudicatory
organ: "If some local laws are found [by the lower-level adjudicatory
organs] to contravene the Constitution, laws and administrative rules, they
should be reported to the people's congress of the province and its standing
committee." 97 Procedurally, this means that the provincial peoples congress or its standing committee then determines the constitutionality of the
law and, in the interim period before the final decision, the adjudicatory
organ cannot apply the law in the case before it. It also means that, if either
body declares the law invalid, the law is unenforceable. The end result is
the same as if the adjudicatory organ itself had declared the law invalid.
The only difference is that the people's congress can disagree with the adjudicatory organ's interpretation, declare the law valid and require the court
to enforce it. I am not aware of an instance in which a lower adjudicatory
organ has exercised this power; however, the Notice is significant as it
points the way toward a form of judicial review of laws in China and, perhaps, if necessary, in the HKSAR. Thus, despite its own lack of authority to
engage in constitutional review and its consequent lack of power to delegate review powers to lower adjudicatory organs, the Supreme People's
Adjudicatory Organ nonetheless has created a form of judicial review for
lower adjudicatory organs.
would ever pass a law capable of being interpreted by the Standing Committee as inconsistent with the Xianfa. Therefore, all laws passed by the NPC or Standing Committee
are presumptively constitutional.
94. Resolution of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Providing an Improved Interpretation of the Law (June 10, 1981), translated in THE LAws oF
THE PEOPLE'S RPuauc OF CHINA 1979-1982, at 251 (1987) [hereinafter Interpretation
Resolution]. The Interpretation Resolution also delegates interpretative authority to the
State Council and the Supreme People's Procuratorate. Id.
95. XLANFA art. 63, sec. 4, art. 67, sec. 6, art. 128 (1982) (P.R.C.).

96. See, e.g., CHEN, supra note 32, at 46.
97. Liu Nanping, "JudicialReview" in China: A Comparative Perspective, 14 REv.
SocIA.IsT L. 245-46 (1988) (citing Notice on Strengthening Economic Adjudication, SEAsoNAL Bum No. 1 (1986) ("The same Notice also contains a similar opinion concerning
regulations in China's Autonomous Regions ..

")).
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c. Judicial/Legislative Review of Law in the HKSAR
The Basic Law could significantly diminish the power of Hong Kong's
courts to review laws for constitutionality. At first glance, Articles 8 and 11
of the Basic Law appear to support continued judicial review. Article 8,
which relates to colonial laws, provides that, "[tihe laws previously in force
in Hong Kong, that is, the common law, rules of equity, ordinances,
subordinate legislation and customary law shall be maintained, except for
any that contravene this Law, and subject to any amendment by the legislature of the [HKSAR]." 98 Article 11, which relates to post-handover laws,
provides that, "no law enacted by the legislature of the [HKSAR] shall contravene this law."9 9
From the common law perspective, both Articles ensure the continuation of the common law system, including judicial review. However, from
the Chinese perspective, Article 8 merely enumerates the types of laws that
will be in effect, not which legal practices and judicial powers will exist.
Chinese legal scholars might interpret the emphasized words in Article 8 to
mean that colonial laws contravening the Basic Law shall not become
HKSAR laws according to Article 160 procedures. They might further interpret Article 11 as a directive authorizing the legislative branch to enact only
constitutional laws.
Article 160, which delegates review of colonial laws to the Standing
Committee, provides a partial elucidation of the meaning of Article 8:
"Upon the establishment of the [HKSAR], the laws previously in force in
Hong Kong shall be adopted as the laws of the Region except for those
which the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress declares
to be in contravention of this Law." 10 0 In the process of its review, the
Standing Committee will interpret the Basic Law and decide which colonial
laws can become HKSAR laws. To this extent, at least, the Basic Law is
legally enforceable.
Article 160's legislative review is consistent with Chinese practice;
however, Article 160 is not clear as to whether Standing Committee review
preempts judicial review. It is probably intended to delegate exclusive
review powers to the Standing Committee because, unlike Article 158, it
does not contain any language directing the Standing Committee to further
delegate power to the HKSAR courts. Such legislative review is consistent
with Chinese legal practice. While the language of Article 160 leans heavily toward such a restrictive interpretation of judicial review, if courts lose
their power to review all of the colonial laws, then Article 160 violates the
spirit, if not the meaning, of the Joint Declaration.
Fortunately, the inconclusive language of Article 160 and the inexplicable difference between Articles 158 and 160 also leave room for an interpretation that supports some form of concurrent review powers. Such
power is what many in Hong Kong, either explicitly or implicitly, advocate.
98. Basic Law, supra note 1, art. 8 (emphasis added).
99. Id. art. 11 (emphasis added).

100. Id. art. 160.
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One view is that the quoted Article 160 language authorizes the Standing
Committee to review colonial laws only in the abstract, leaving the courts
to perform a second review in concrete cases. Another interpretation is
that Article 160 does not eliminate judicial review of colonial laws altogether because it only gives the Standing Committee the power to reject
laws that contravene the Basic Law but not to decide that HKSAR laws are
constitutional. The judiciary alone would have that power. This interpretation is unsatisfactory as the quoted language specifically requires the
Standing Committee to determine which colonial laws conflict with the
Basic Law. Nonetheless, the two approaches are given some support by
recent Chinese statements that the purpose of carrying out the Article 160
review is to amend or reject laws, such as "[tihe British 'letters patent,' the
law instructions and certain laws like the British Nationality Act and certain laws [which refer to titles such as] Your Majesty [and] the Queen's
Counsel." 10 1 Such a limited review makes it much easier to argue that
Article 160 does not involve a comprehensive constitutional review of laws
by the Standing Committee.
Furthermore, if the presumption in favor of preserving the common
law system applies, then courts should be able to assume review powers.
Unfortunately, it is unrealistic to expect the HKSAR courts to assume powers without some explicit indication from the Chinese either approving of
Article 160 judicial review or endorsing the common law presumption
principle. Otherwise, the potential for political conflict is too high to
expect courts to act unilaterally. Without Chinese approval, judges will
have to interpret the intention of the NPC when it adopted Article 160, and
the intention of the Standing Committee when it reviewed colonial laws.
They would have to assume the NPC, even though perhaps not intending to
authorize judicial review, did intend to defer to the common law position
on ambiguous Basic Law provisions. Additionally, courts will have no way
of knowing whether or not the Standing Committee intended to leave any
space within which a judge might be able to take a second look at the
colonial law being challenged. They will have to assume the Standing
Committee decision to allow the colonial law to become an HKSAR law
either was not intended to bind courts in concrete cases or did not include
a review for constitutionality.
For example, is a court prepared to use Article 27's102 freedom of
speech provision to strike down a draconian colonial law restricting freedom of speech even if the law has already been approved by the Standing
Committee? Assuming Article 27 is directly enforceable, the court could
apply it to protect speech rights ina case in which no law exists or a posthandover law is being challenged; however, it would face the Article 160
question if a colonial law is being attacked. I do not believe the court
would strike down the law if there were even the slightest hint that the
Chinese would object on Article 160 grounds. The only alternative would
101. Jim Laurie, The Future According to Lu Ping, S.
1996, at 15 (quoting Lu Ping).
102. Basic Law, supra note 1, art. 27.

CHINA MORNING POST, May 30,
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be for the courts to avoid applying unconstitutional laws by ruling them
inappropriate in each individual case. Avoidance is not the same as judicial review. Such a course is not an attractive solution because it is only a
stopgap measure and the courts could not apply it in all cases. Nonetheless, if China forces a restrictive interpretation of Article 160 upon the judiciary, this may be the only available option.
Thus, even though courts could argue for judicial review powers consistent with the common law, they are unlikely to take such a bold step.
More importantly, Hong Kong's regional courts are not well equipped to
engage in such politically charged struggles for power, and, so, I do not see
much hope for the judiciary to take a second look at colonial laws.
Article 160 poses an additional problem for common law and rules of
equity. In order to fulfill its Article 160 responsibilities, the Chinese government has already commenced a review of all of Hong Kong's approximately 600 ordinances and almost 1,000 pieces of subsidiary
legislation. 10 3 China will certainly not complete its review by the handover
date. Additionally, the Chinese are not reviewing, nor have they ever indicated any intention to review, common law, rules of equity and customary
law, 10 4 even though the Standing Committee has the power to review them
since they constitute part of the laws of Hong Kong.' 0 5 Mainland scholars
and politicians appear not to grasp the fact that common law and rules of
equity are as much law as is statutory law. Therefore, the question is not
how the Chinese intended to deal with common law, rules of equity and
customary law under Article 160, because it is apparent from the Basic Law
that the Chinese did not intend anything. The question for the courts will
be, instead, whether they should undertake judicial review of such (colonial) laws or refer the law in question to the Standing Committee.
Article 160 interjects further uncertainty into the common law. The
second part of Article 160 states that "[i]f any laws are later discovered to
be in contravention of this Law, they shall be amended or cease to have
force in accordance with the procedure as prescribed by this Law." 10 6 The
words later discovered can mean that colonial laws that become HKSAR
laws either (i) are all assumed to be constitutional as ofJuly 1, 1997, or (ii)
are constitutional only if the Standing Committee specifically declares
them to be constitutional as ofJuly 1. In either case, the words amended or
cease to have force would permit such laws to be enforced until some body
declares them unconstitutional. However, Article 160 does not state
whether the courts or the Standing Committee is authorized to "discover"
the unconstitutional law. As discussed above, Article 160 only authorizes
the Standing Committee to review and, unlike Article 158, does not provide for sub-delegation to the courts. Any attempt by the courts to asstlime
such authority would be politically sensitive. Thus, unless and until the
Chinese clarify the extent to which the Standing Committee will continue
103.
104.
105.
106.

Rain Ren, Beijing Will Undertake Law Review, E. ExpREsS, Oct. 25, 1994, at 2.
Basic Law, supra note 1, art. 8.
Id.
Id. art. 160.
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to exercise Article 160 review powers after June 30, 1997, the HKSAR
court's competence to review colonial-era laws of questionable constitutional character remains unclear.
Xiao Weiyun, who headed the Basic Law Drafting Committee and continues to be a highly authoritative voice on the official Chinese view of the
Basic Law, states that colonial laws discovered after 1997 to violate the
07
Basic Law will be handled by the Standing Committee and Legco.
According to Xiao, the Standing Committee will not directly declare the
laws invalid or amend them. It will send the offending law back to Legco
which will decide whether to repeal or amend the law.10 8 Xiao's solution
splits the courts' power in half. The Standing Committee decides on the
constitutionality, but Legco declares the law unenforceable. This procedure raises numerous jurisdictional and procedural issues. Does the
Standing Committee alone have the power to decide whether a colonial law
violates the Basic Law? What if the question arises during a trial? Must
the court turn the question over to the Standing Committee? What happens if the Standing Committee decides that a law is contrary to the Basic
Law and a court case at the time hinges on the existence of that law? Must
the court wait until Legco formally repeals or amends the law before it can
enter a judgment? Is the law effective in the time period between the Standing Committee decision and Legco action? What about common law, rules
of equity and customary law? Is Xiao suggesting that only Legco will have
the responsibility for repealing and amending non-statutory laws? At present, courts can modify or overrule common law and rules of equity,
although Legco can overrule both common law and equity by passing a
new law.
Courts, then, will have three choices when the constitutionality of an
ambiguous colonial-era law is at issue: (a) they can refer the law to the
Standing Committee for legislative review; (b) they can treat the law as
valid and apply it even though the court, if operating within the common
law tradition, would declare the law repugnant to the Basic Law; or (c) they
can assume judicial review power over the law.
The first option is the least politically sensitive, but it poses a plethora
of problems for the judiciary. It effectively requires a complete transformation ofjudicial practices and procedures during the course of adjudication.
However, if Xiao is correct, this may be the only option for the courts. The
second option is not much better, as it also destroys judicial independence
and the principles underlying the common law system. If courts elect
either of these two options, judges will be no different from Chinese legal
officials. The third option, while consistent with the common law, is
highly political. Hong Kong's conservative judges are unlikely to take any
action that directly challenges Chinese authority.
107. XIAo W ,UN, XIANGGANGJIBENFA YU YIGuo LIANGZHIDE WEIDA SHUIAN [IMPLEMEwrING THE HONG KONG BAsIc LAw AND ONE CouNTY Two SYsTEMs Poucy] 85 (1993).
108. Id.
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The conclusion, then, is inescapable: the HKSAR courts will have to
steer through uncharted waters and learn to navigate around dangerous
legal and political whirlpools when called upon to interpret colonial-era
laws (including, unfortunately, common law, rules of equity and customary law). Despite China's contentions of having solved the "one country,
two systems" contradictions, the Basic Law provides very little guidance on
how to handle a politically sensitive issue of local/central legal relations.
In fact, it seriously complicates the operation of law in the HKSAR.
The court's ability to review new legislation is on somewhat more
solid ground. An answer to the question of whether courts can interpret
the Basic Law language "no law enacted by the legislature of the [HKSAR]
shall contravene this law" 10 9 to include judicial review of new legislation is
found in Article 17, which states in relevant part:
If the Standing Committee.... after consulting the Committee for the Basic
Law of the [HKSARJ under it, considers that any law enacted by the legislature of the Region is not in conformity with the provisions of this Law
regarding affairs within the responsibility of the Central Authorities or
regarding the relationship between the Central Authorities and the Region,
the Standing Committee may return the law in question but shall not amend
it. Any law returned by the Standing Committee... shall immediately be
invalidated. This invalidation shall not have110
retroactive effect, unless otherwise provided for in the laws of the Region.
Both Articles 17 and 160 involve constitutional review of legislation. However, Article 17 limits the scope of the Standing Committee's competence to
review while Article 160 does not. Wu Jianfan, a legal advisor to the Chinese government on Hong Kong legal affairs, agrees that Article 17 limits
Standing Committee powers. "The central government will have nothing to
say about inconsistent laws if they do not involve the central
government."1 1 1
The negative inference one can draw from both Article 17 and Wu's
statement is that the courts will have judicial review powers over all new
laws that the Standing Committee cannot review under Article 17. The
limitation on judicial review in Article 17 implies a division of review pow109. Basic Law, supra note 1, art. 11.
110. Id. art. 17. Article 17 presents a further problem in that bills become effective
when the legislature adopts them, but the Standing Committee, which is under no obligation to return bills within any particular time period, can repeal them. This raises the
possibility that an unconstitutional law could be effective for a short period of time and
then be repealed by the Standing Committee. The only solution is for Legco to include a
provision that the bill will only become effective upon its entry into the Standing Committee record. Under the present system, bills signed by the Governor theoretically do
not become effective until approved by the Crown. Letters Patent, supra note 48, art. XI.
However, as the Crown never disallows any bills signed by the Hong Kong governor
(who is, in any event, a servant of the Crown), bills always contain clauses permitting
new laws to become effective immediately.
111. WuJianfan, Fundamental Norms in the Relationship Between the Central Government of China and the Hong Kong Special AdministrativeRegion, 16 H.K L1AOWANG [Ou-r
LooK], Apr. 16, 1990, at 26-27, translatedinJ.P.R.S.-CAR-90-057, at 69, 70 (F.B.I.S. July

31, 1990).
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ers between the Standing Committee and the courts similar to the division
of interpretation powers under Article 158. The only other interpretation,
which is highly implausible, is that laws not involving the central government will not be scrutinized at all. The only logical and meaningful interpretation of Article 17 is that it permits courts to exercise judicial review
powers of interpretation for the purpose of reviewing new laws not submitted'to the Standing Committee for review.
Notwithstanding the reasonableness of this interpretation, the inconsistency between Articles 17 and 160 regarding review of laws is problematic. If the Chinese insist that Article 160 confers exclusive power to review
all colonial laws on the Standing Committee, then the combination of Artides 17 and 160 will give rise to a system of judicial powers lacking in any
logic or cohesiveness. Courts will be able to apply common law principles
when interpreting and applying most new laws but unable to interpret and
refer to common law principles when faced with old laws. The sole basis
for the difference in judicial powers and judicial treatment of laws will be
the new law/old law dichotomy demarcated solely by a date-July 1, 1997rather than by a legal principle. The Basic Law gives no clue as to whether
Articles 17 and 160 should be interpreted independently or consistently.
One can only offer a conjecture at this point. The inconsistency could be
due to a drafting oversight; however, oversight implies a desire for internal
consistency, which is not evident anywhere in the Basic Law. It could also
be that the Chinese, who are unfamiliar with the role of common law
courts in interpreting legislation, simply copied the style of the Xianfa without any regard to problems that could arise later due to internal inconsistencies and imprecise language. The most likely explanation for the
inconsistency is a political one. China drafted the provisions to give the
new sovereign almost total control over the content of the HKSAR's laws. A
restrictive interpretation of Articles 17 and 160 gives the Chinese control
over all colonial laws and some post-handover laws. ' Additionally, Article
45 gives the Chinese government indirect control over all new legislation
Chief Executive, who will oversee introthrough its power to appoint the
112
duction of new bills to Legco.
China's desire to control the HKSAR's laws is already evident. Hong
Kong recently witnessed a heated, and often hostile, debate between the
Chinese and Hong Kong governments over the powers of the to-be-established Court of Final Appeals (CFA). As recently as 1995, during SinoBritish discussions on establishment of the CFA, the Chinese reportedly
told the British they do not want the CFA to have "power inquire into the

112. Basic Law, supra note 1, arts. 62(5) (the government shall "draft and introduce
bills, motions and subordinate legislation"), 48(3) (the Chief Executive shall "sign bills
passed by the Legislative Council and.., promulgate laws"), 74 (Legco members "may
introduce bills ... which do not relate to public expenditure or political structure or the
operation of the government" and the Chief Executive must approve the introduction of
"bills relating to government policies").
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constitutionality of laws." 113 Other reports refer ambiguously to the Chinese desire to settle the issue of the CFA's "scope of judicial administration," which presumably refers to jurisdiction.1 4 Fortunately, the Hong
Kong government did not include any restrictions on court jurisdiction or
powers in its final bill to set up the CFA. Nonetheless, if the reports of
China's concerns about judicial powers are true, then it is not farfetched to
imagine that China will take the narrowest possible view of Articles 17 and
160 in order to restrict, to the maximum extent possible, the courts' ability
to review laws.
3. Judicial Review in the Bill of Rights Ordinance
A second judicial review dispute exploded in late 1995 over the BRO. The
dispute raises many issues requiring clarification prior to 1997, but the
main disagreement revolves around the still-unarticulated issue of whether
or not HKSAR courts will have power to review laws for constitutionality or
for conflict with the BRO.
a. The BRO's Pre-Handover Status
Prior to July 1, 1997, the BRO implements much of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), n 5 which Britain extended to
Hong Kong on August 20, 1976. After July 1, Article 39 of the Basic Law
authorizes the incorporation of ICCPR provisions into HKSAR law. Article
39 provides: "The provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.... as applied to Hong Kong shall remain in force and shall
1 16
be implemented through the laws of the [HKSAR]."
As previously explained, 117 the BRO also has a quasi-constitutional
status until July 1, 1997, despite its being an ordinary piece of legislation.
The Hong Kong government intended the BRO to comport with Article 39
of the Basic Law in order to minimize any possibility that the BRO might
not withstand Standing Committee scrutiny under Article 160. As will be
seen, 118 the attempt has failed primarily because the BRO has a broad
scope and implements most of the ICCPR provisions Britain extended to
Hong Kong in 1976. The broad scope of the BRO reflects the view of the
Hong Kong government that the Article 39 phrase as applied to Hong Kong
means the ICCPR as extended to Hong Kong in 1976 rather than to the
extent it was actually implemented in Hong Kong prior to the BRO.
113. Sally Blyth, E. Exprpss, May 3, 1995, at 1, reported in F.B.I.S.-CHI-95-085, May 3,
not understand that lower courts also "inquire into

1995, at 71. They apparently still do

the constitutionality of laws."

114. Shi Qingbin, Why Are the Sino-British Talks on the Court of Final Appeal Deadlocked?,ZHONGGuo TONGXUN [CHINA NEws], Apr. 23, 1995, translated in F.B.I.S.-CHI-95-

078, Apr. 24, 1995, at 88; Chris Yeung & So Lai-fun, S. CHINA MORNING POST,Mar. 13,
1995, at 1, reported in F.B.I.S.-CHI-95-048, Mar. 13. 1995, at 104, 105.

115. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
116. Basic Law, supra note 1, art. 39.

117. See supra text accompanying notes 87-90.
118. See infra text accompanying notes 122-33.
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The Chinese Interpretation of Article 39

In contrast, Chinese officials interpret Article 39 quite narrowly. In
China's view, the phrase as applied to Hong Kong means the extent to which
the ICCPR was actually in effect in Hong Kong when the Joint Declaration
was signed in 1984.119 Unfortunately, prior to the BRO, Britain failed to
implement all of the ICCPR provisions in Hong Kong, which is evident in
the number of laws that courts have struck down since the enactment of
the BRO. Support for China's static view of Hong Kong's law comes from
the Joint Declaration phrase calling for "laws currently in force in Hong
Kong [to] remain basically unchanged." 120 Lu Ping, Director of the Hong
Kong and Macao Affairs Office, makes the Chinese position clear when he
says, "The parts in the two human rights conventions [including the
ICCPRI that have been applicable to Hong Kong... must be implemented
through the local laws of Hong Kong." 12 1 Mr. Lu restricts Article 39 to
those portions of the ICCPR that Hong Kong had actually enacted into law
and not the entire ICCPR as extended by Britain to Hong Kong.
China's rulers expected the Joint Declaration to freeze the 1984 legal
regime in time so they could take over a community restrained by the same
repressive colonial laws that were available for use by Britain during its
colonial tenure. The broad scope of the BRO directly confronts that view
because it permits courts and the government to repeal numerous laws,
such as reverse presumption laws that place the burden of proof on criminal defendants and draconian colonial laws that suppress civil rights. The
loss of these powerful police enforcement tools provoked Chinese officials
to voice concerns about a potential breakdown of law and order in Hong
Kong and firmly entrenched Chinese opposition to the BRO.
Consequently, if any HKSAR court declares a law invalid under the
BRO on the grounds that the ICCPR, as signed by the prior colonial ruler,
is the baseline for interpreting Article 39, China will certainly interpret the
declaration as an act of defiance challenging its sovereignty. The court's
declaration would be tantamount to binding China to an international covenant it has never signed and, even worse, binding it according to the terms
agreed to by the British colonial government. China will definitely not
countenance a judge (possibly even an expatriate one) defining the extent
to which it is "bound" to the terms of an international human rights
instrument.
c.

The Chinese View of Judicial Review in the BRO

The Chinese also attack the BRO for its "overriding" effect, claiming it
119. See, e.g., May Sin-mi Hon, Tung's Office to Hold Constitution on Rights Laws, S.
Post, Mar. 21, 1997, at 6 (HKSAR Chief Executive designate Tung Cheehua "considers 'previously in place' as meaning 1984 when the Joint Declaration was
CHINA MORNING

signed.").

120. Joint Declaration, supra note 2, art. 3, sec. 3.
121.

XIA YUIUA, ZHONGGUO XINWENSHE [NEw CHINA

NEws AGENcY], May 6, 1994,

translatedin F.B.I.S.-CHI-94-088, May 6, 1994, at 74 (emphasis added). Note the phrase
applicable to could also have been translated as "applieod in."
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would be above the Basic Law. 12 2 They brand the BRO "queer" and
"absurd" because it is so different from other laws, i.e., it provides for judicial review. 123 Their complaint stems primarily from an unwarranted, but
understandable, fear of a "no holds barred" judiciary. 124 Their fear ofjudicial review powers is understandable when one realizes that there is no
125
judicial review in China.
Accordingly, the Standing Committee has approved the "repeal" of
BRO Articles 3 and 4, which authorize review of pre- and post-BRO
laws. 126 Constitutional support for judicial review of post-BRO laws will
also end on July 1, 1997, with the demise of the Letters Patent. Thus, the
BRO will simply be another HKSAR law on July 1.
Nonetheless, the Hong Kong Bar Association argues that, "with or
without the [BRO].... a law [contrary to the BRO] would also be inconsistent with Article 39 of the Basic Law... and would be unconstitutional and
liable to be declared so by judges exercising powers of final adjudication
under Article 19 of the Basic Law." 12 7 This position rests on two unexamined assumptions: first, the Basic Law (or at least Article 39) is directly
enforceable; and second, the phrases independentjudicial power and final
adjudication in Article 19 give courts power to judicially review laws for
constitutionality.
The first assumption, that Article 39 is directly enforceable, is questionable because, as previously discussed, 128 the direct enforceability of
Basic Law provisions has yet to be clarified. However, with regard to Article 39, the Chinese position is clear. During the public debate over the
BRO, Chinese officials maintained two inconsistent (from the common law
perspective) positions. They declared that, on the one hand, the BRO is
unnecessary because the Basic Law provides sufficient rights protections, 129 which implies that Article 39 and other rights provisions in the
Basic Law are directly enforceable. However, on the other hand, they also
refuse to allow the ICCPR to be directly enforceable through Article 39. Lu
122. Jimmy Cheung, Heavyweights Sent to Fix Bill, E.ExPREass, Oct. 29, 1995, at 1.
123. See, e.g., Jimmy Cheung, Ordinance is Illegal, Says PWC, E.ExpRESS, Oct. 28-29,
1995, at 2.
124. Wing Kay Po, Editor Reviews Debate History, E. ExpRESs, May 3, 1995, at 15,

reported in F.B.I.S.-CHI-95-085, May 3, 1995, at 72, 73.
125. See infra discussion accompanying notes 91-97.
126. DA GONG BAO (Hong Kong), Mar. 24, 1997, at B3. Basic Law Article 160 does
not authorize the Standing Committee to modify colonial laws; it merely empowers the
Standing Committee to declare laws "to be in contravention of" the Basic Law. Id.
Repeal of some provisions of a law is no different from amending the law-both actions
alter the laws substance.
127. A Bill to Protect the People's Rights, E.Exp1'ass, Dec. 5, 1995, at 10. See Mary Luk
& Leo Law, Law Society Calls PWC to Order on Ordinance,B. ExPRss, Oct. 27, 1995, at 2.
128. See supra Part I.C.1.
129. See, e.g., Jimmy Cheung & Sally Blyth, Bill of Rights Controversy Spreads, E.
ExpREsS, Oct. 19, 1995, at 1 (quoting China's Vice-Foreign Minister, Jiang Enzhu: "Basic
Law has provided enough protection for the people of Hong Kong of their rights");

Cheung, supra note 123, at 2 (quoting Shao Tianren, Preliminary Working Committee,
Legal Subgroup convener: "Bill of Rights was unnecessary because the Basic Law safeguards human rights after 1997").
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Ping stated quite emphatically that the Basic Law "provides full legal safeguards" but that "the two human rights conventions cannot be directly
applied to Hong Kong [and] [t]here was a consensus on this point when the
Basic Law was drafted." 130 However, if the BRO is unnecessary and the
Basic Law is the source of human rights protections, the only way the
ICCPR could be applied would be through the direct enforcement of Article
39. Mr. Lu clearly rejects this interpretation. One is left wondering, then,
just what the Chinese intended when. they agreed to include Article 39.
Lastly, it is worth noting in passing that Mr. Lu's statement also means that
the Basic Law drafters, who merely wrote but did not enact the Basic Law,
have power to pre-empt the right of the Standing Committee and the courts
to "interpret" the Basic Law. If the drafters do have this power, then Article
158 of the Basic Law should be rewritten to delegate interpretation powers
to the drafting committee.
Before July 1, 1997, no conflict exists between the BRO and Hong
Kong's colonial constitution, because the constitution does not contain any
rights provisions that could conflict with the BRO. Nor do conflicts exist
in countries having written common law constitutions containing rights
provisions because constitutional rights are directly enforceable and superior to all other laws. The problem will arise in the HKSAR because the
Basic Law is modeled after the Xianfa and, consequently, incorporates
inconsistent Xianfa concepts, such as programmatic, judicially unenforceable constitutional provisions.
The second assumption, that Article 19 gives courts judicial review
power, is also problematic as it is constructed around common law principles of judicial independence and constitutionalism that the Basic Law
threatens. Article 19 states that "[Ihe [HKSAR] shall be vested with
13 1
independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication."
Neither independent judicial power nor final adjudication is explicitly
defined but partial definitions are found in Articles 17, 158 and 160.
These three Articles strip the HKSAR courts of their power and independence. 13 2 They fundamentally alter the relationship between the regional
courts and the central government, rendering it impossible for HKSAR
courts to determine the precise meaning of Article 19.
Therefore, as the Standing Committee has repealed the judicial review
provisions of the BRO, HKSARjudges will be under severe constraints mitigating against declaring any law unconstitutional on the basis of either
Article 39 or Article 19. I do not believe that Hong Kong's judges will be
willing to walk through the political minefield such a declaration would
require. The problem is not a legal one so much as a political one which
Hong Kong's common law courts are ill-equipped to handle. The Hong
Kong and Chinese governments must resolve this issue.
130. X, supra note 121 (emphasis added).
131. Basic Law, supra note 1, art. 19.
132. See supra Part I.C. 1 and II.C.2.c.
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Even if the Standing Committee had permitted the BRO to become
HKSAR law without any alterations, the BRO could not have preserved the
court's present monopoly on judicial review. Courts would still be forced
to share BRO review power with the Standing Committee. 133 BRO review
of legislation from two crucial time periods is involved: legislation enacted
before the BRO and legislation enacted after the BRO. Each category will
suffer a similar, though not identical, fate after the handover.
d. Review of Pre-BRO Laws
Courts will find it difficult, if not impossible, to review legislation enacted
prior to the BRO, as the Standing Committee has stripped the BRO of provisions authorizing such review. In any event, this power would probably
also disappear through the operation of Article 160 of the Basic Law
because courts will probably be forced to declare that Article 160 only
authorizes Standing Committee review of colonial laws. If courts fail to
assume concurrent Article 160 review powers, then a Standing Committee
declaration that certain colonial laws will become laws of the HKSAR is
also a declaration that these laws do not violate Article 39. If the colonial
law is not repugnant to the Basic Law, it is not repugnant to Article 39 of
the Basic Law. It follows that, if the law is not repugnant to Article 39, it is
not repugnant to the BRO either as the BRO draws the scope of its authority from Article 39. The BRO cannot have a broader scope than Article 39.
Thus, even if the BRO were to remain intact at the handover, Article 160
would prevent courts from engaging in BRO review of any colonial laws
approved by the Standing Committee.
Furthermore, colonial laws that are not reviewed under Article 160 by
the Standing Committee by July 1, 1997 (the "left-over laws") would only
be reviewable by the courts at great risk. If courts review left-over laws for
compliance with the BRO, they will effectively be circumventing Standing
Committee review under Article 160 because a BRO review is but a species
of Article 39 review. Under the narrow interpretation of Article 160, only
the Standing Committee is authorized to engage in Article 39 review of
colonial laws. Even after a court's decision on a left-over law's BRO status,
the Standing Committee could still assert Article 160 jurisdiction to rereview the colonial law and declare it repugnant to the Basic Law, hence to
Article 39, hence to the BRO. It could also reinstate laws for nonrepugnance.
If courts are unwilling to assume judicial review powers under Article
160, they will be bound to enforce colonial laws approved (or yet to be
reviewed) by the Standing Committee whether or not common law principles or interpretations of the ICCPR from other jurisdictions would require
the courts to declare the laws unenforceable for repugnance to the BRO.
The problem lies in the nature of the BRO. It duplicates Article 39, is not a
part of the constitution, is inferior to the Basic Law, and may not be used to
override the Standing Committee's power under Article 160.
133. Basic Law, supra note 1, art. 19.
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Review of Post-BRO Legislation

The courts' power to review post-BRO legislation for repugnance to the
BRO ends at midnight, June 30, 1997, with the demise of the Letters Patent 13 4 However, courts might decide that Article 39 provides the necessary constitutional authority for review of all pre- and post-BRO laws. This
interpretation would necessarily rest on erroneous assumptions about
HKSAR judicial review. As previously discussed, it is unlikely that the
courts will have any power to review any colonial legislation (either pre- or
post-BRO) because that power is probably reserved exclusively to the
Standing Committee under Article 160.135 Furthermore, even if the Standing Committee were to decide not to interfere with the use of Article 39 to
support judicial review of laws enacted post-handover, Article 17 limits the
review to laws not reviewable by the Standing Committee. 13 6 At the most,
then, courts might be able to review certain, if not most, new laws for compliance with the BRO.
In summary, even if the Standing Committee had not removed the
BRO's judicial review provisions, the BRO would almost certainly not be
available for review of pre-BRO colonial laws, probably not be available for
review of post-BRO colonial laws and, if applicable at all to post-BRO laws,
would at most be applicable to HKSAR laws not reviewable by the Standing
Committee pursuant to Article 17. The result is that most of the courts'
present BRO power to review laws will almost certainly die a natural death
on July 1, 1997.
4. Judicial Review of Executive and Administrative Acts
The next question is whether Article 158 of the Basic Law authorizes the
HKSAR courts to interpret the Basic Law for the purpose of ruling on the
constitutionality of executive and administrative acts. This form of judicial
review is absolutely essential to the preservation of a rule of law system
because is codifies the principle that no person, not even the highest member of the executive branch, is above the law. It is the difference between a
rule of law system and a rule by law system.
a. Judicial Review of Executive and Administrative Branches in Hong
Kong
The rule of law principle is firmly entrenched in Hong Kong's common law
according to which the courts have power to:
restrain the Executive by the use of powers and procedures established
under the Common Law, such as the issuing of a writ of habeas corpus....
They can also interpret the words of the Letters Patent to decide whether the
Governor is entitled to act as he has done, and they could
if necessary issue
13 7
an injunction to forbid the Governor to act in this way.
134. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
135. See supra Part II.C.2.c.

136. Basic Law, supra note 1, art. 17.
137. MRms, supra note 51, at 58.
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The power extends to the entire executive branch. The primary tool
the judiciary uses to control administrative abuse of power is the ultravires
doctrine:
Ultra vires ... is the principal legal means by which the Rule of Law is
enforced against the executive branch of government. Officials must operate
within their powers. Should they fail to do so they are subject to judicial
review;, their decisions may be quashed... or pronounced null and void ....
they can be prevented from carrying out an unlawful decision.., and they
can be ordered to do their duty .... 138
Additional statutory authority to review administrative and executive
acts is found in the BRO, which binds "(a) the Government and all public
authorities; and (b) any person acting on behalf of the Government or a
public authority." 13 9 Courts may award monetary remedies or issue
140
orders as they "[consider] appropriate and just in the circumstances."
b. Judicial Review of Administrative Acts in China
Adjudicative organs can also review administrative actions of administrative agencies (xingzheng jiguan) and those of their personnel (xingzheng
jiguan gongzuoren), but not executive actions. 14 1 China's Civil Law permits
citizens or legal persons to sue state organs or their personnel for infringing upon their legitimate rights. 142 The Administrative Litigation Law,
which China enacted in 1989, broadens the scope of the adjudicatory
organs' power to review actions taken by administrative organs. 143 It
enables citizens, legal persons and other organizations to file suits against
administrative agencies and their personnel for violations of eight types of
concrete administrative actions.144 Chinese law does not permit adjudicatory organs to review official acts of the country's top leaders. 14 5
c. Judicial Review of Executive Branch in HKSAR
As mentioned previously, the BRO provides one basis for judicial review of
administrative acts. 146 If the Chinese remove such review powers from the
138. PEm WEsLEY-SmrrH, 2 CONSTITUTIONAL

& ADMINISTRATIVE

LAw IN HONG KONG

313 (1988).
139. Bill of Rights Ordinance, supra note 54, art. 7.
140. Id. art. 6.
141. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minfa Tongze [General Code of the Civil Law of
the PRC] (adopted Apr. 12, 1986) art. 121, translatedin III STATUTES AND REGULATIONS OF
CmNA 860412.1 (1988).
142. Id. ("State organs or officials shall, in the discharge of official duties, bear civil

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBUC OF

liability for any acts which infringe on the lawful interests of citizens or legal persons
who have suffered losses as a result.")
143. Zhonghua Rermin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa [Administrative Litigation

Law of China] (adopted April 4, 1989), translatedin VI STATUTES AND REGULATIONS OF
mE PEOpLE'S REPUBUC OF CHm 890404.2 (1990).
144. Id. arts. 2, 5, 11.
145. For a more thorough discussion ofjudicial review of administrative actions, see
CHEN, supra note 32, at 176-84; Susan Finder, Like Throwing an Egg Against a Stone?
Administrative Litigation in the People's Republic of China, 3 J. CHINESE L. 1 (1989).

146. See supra text accompanying notes 139-40.
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*BRO, courts will be left with their common law powers of review. However,
the Basic Law might modify those powers also. Common law distinguishes
between the executive and the administrative; the former includes the president, prime minister, governor, the cabinet, etc., while the latter includes
government agencies that implement the directions of the executive and the
laws passed by the legislature. Basic Law Article 35 states that "Hong Kong
residents shall have the right to institute legal proceedings in the courts
against the acts of the executive authorities (xingzheng bumen) and their
personnel (xingzheng renyuan)." 14 7 The Basic Law thus sanctions judicial
review of the executive while Chinese law does not. China's Administrative
Litigation Law only permits actions against xingzhengjiguan,which is commonly translated as "administrativeagencies or organs." If the difference in
wording between the two laws is intentional, then Article 35 simply continues the present common law power of the courts to engage in judicial
review of the executive branch and administrative agencies. If the difference is due to sloppy drafting, then China may have intended to limit judicial review to administrative agencies, consistent with the practice in
China.
Although Article 35 is not ambiguous and judicial review of executive
acts is consistent with the common law, the Chinese could, and I believe
certainly will, insist that courts have no power to review acts of the Chief
Executive of the HKSAR. The Chinese have no experience with the rule of
law and would be horrified at the suggestion that mere judges, some of
whom are expatriates, might have the right to criticize a leader and even to
issue an injunction directing the Chief Executive to cease from engaging in
certain actions. If HKSAR courts are unable to engage in review of executive actions, Hong Kong's rule of law system will be set on its head. Hong
Kong will become a rule by law society. Such a gross violation of the Joint
Declaration would be justifiably condemned by all.
5. Application of Basic Law Provisions to Facts of Cases
Assuming some of the Basic Law is directly enforceable, the most narrow
view of Article 158 is that HKSAR courts can interpret enforceable Basic
Law provisions solely to answer the question of whether or not a party
before the court properly invoked the provision. If so, the court could then
apply the provision to the facts of the case. This situation would only arise
in the absence of applicable law. Such a narrow interpretation of Article
147. Basic Law, supra note 1, art. 35 (emphasis added). Prior to the final drafting of

the Basic Law, Michael Davis inquired whether Article 35 also "include[s] a challenge of
the underlying supporting statute." MicHAE. C. DAvis,

CONsTI-tmONAL CONFRONTATION

20 (1989). Unfortunately, the final draft failed to address his query;
however, under the Chinese Administrative Litigation Law, one may challenge only the
action, and not the law. Administrative Litigation Law of China, supra note 143, art. 11.
Similarly, in the HKSAR, if the Standing Committee approves the underlying ordinance
or subordinate legislation pursuant to Article 17 or 160, the answer will have to be no.
Only if the underlying ordinance or subordinate legislation fits within the scope of the
judiciary's review powers under Article 17 might a party be able to challenge the law.
INHONG KONG

1997

Lost in the Translation

158 is a gross distortion of the meaning of the term within the common law
system and must be rejected.
6. Resolving the Conflicts
The Basic Law's division of interpretation powers between the courts and
the Standing Committee poses a tremendous threat to the stability and
coherence of the legal system. The Basic Law contemplates two bodies
working in tandem, applying different legal principles and employing different methodologies, yet arriving at different interpretations having effect
within one legal system.
The Chinese probably believe they have reduced the possibility of any
conflict by inserting a provision in Articles 158 and 17 (but not Article
160) requiring the Standing Committee to "consult" with the "Committee
for the Basic Law" of the HKSAR prior to rendering an interpretation. The
composition of the Committee is not yet known, but it will certainly
include Chinese and Hong Kong members who may, or may not, have
expertise in Hong Kong law. Even if some members are familiar with Hong
Kong's legal system, the fact remains that the Standing Committee, which
is itself a non-judicial body, will rely upon the advice of another non-judicial body for advice on how to render a legal interpretation. Wu Jianfan
believes Hong Kong Committee members will provide valuable assistance
to the Standing Committee because they will contribute information and
opinion about the HKSAR situation.1 48 However, familiarity with the views
of Hong Kong people is not a sufficient basis for lawmaking in a common
law system. If it were, judges would not need to be trained in the law. Wu
sees no problem in having a select group of individuals, many of whom
may have no legal training and who may be more concerned with protecting their own political or economic interests than in upholding legal principles, play a major role in determining constitutional issues. Unfortunately,
comments such as Wu's only further expose China's distrust of the
independent role of Hong Kong's judiciary, misunderstanding of the common law system, and failure to appreciate the negative effect the Basic Law
will have upon both the judiciary and the law.
If the judiciary does lose judicial review powers, the significance of the
loss will go beyond merely a weakening of the court's authority. The loss
will place courts in an untenable and anomalous situation. Judges hear
cases on an individual basis and do not decide in a collegiate bench in the
first instance. A single trial court judge or even several judges on an appellate bench will have to decide, on his or her own, to assume judicial review
power. Will judges have the strength to carry out their convictions or will
they compromise principles once they understand the Chinese view? Will
common law-trained judges be able to make the transition to a common
law/socialist-civil law reality? Will the present members of the judiciary
even remain after 1997 once they realize what the Basic Law will require of
them? The Hong Kong and Chinese governments must, at some point,
148. Wu, supra note 45, at 20. See also Zheng, supra note 46, at 321-22.
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address this looming constitutional crisis, because, I believe, any strategy
based upon the belief in the ability of the judiciary to act assertively is
doomed to fail.
If the answers to the above questions are no, then judges who choose
to remain will have no choice but to enforce some laws that they would
otherwise declare unenforceable under common law principles, precedents
or international standards. This situation will reduce judges to operating
in a bureaucratic manner similar to China's legal officials and will, by the
courts' acquiescence to the diminished role of the judiciary, bring socialist
civil law principles on judicial powers into Hong Kong's common law system. Alternatively, if courts are reluctant to take a political stance to preserve the common law and balk at enforcing unconstitutional laws, they
could decide to follow the advice in the Notice by the Supreme People's
Adjudicatory Organ discussed previously. 149 They could circumvent the
political dilemma by returning unconstitutional legislation to Legco,
accompanied by a request for the law's repeal or amendment. However, by
doing so, the courts would openly acknowledge their inferior position,
which would also allow the Chinese legal system to seep into the HKSAR.
None of this confusion, uncertainty or inconsistency is necessitated by
any language in the Joint Declaration. On the contrary, the Joint Declaration promises that the HKSAR "will enjoy a high degree of autonomy,
except in foreign and defence affairs" and that its courts will have
independent judicial power."50 Articles 17, 158, and 160 of the Basic Law
amount to gross deviations from these promises. They render the terms
high degree of autonomy and independence of the judiciary almost meaning-

less because they divide the existing judicial powers into overlapping judicial powers and legislative powers. Even worse, they do so in an incoherent
and unprincipled manner. If China insists on a restrictive interpretation of
Articles 17, 158, and 160, it will totally transform Hong Kong's present
legal system from one having an internal logic and consistency into one
with several logics and no overall consistency. Rather than solving the contradictions inherent in the "one country, two legal systems" policy, the
Basic Law could actually create problems having no obvious, coherent or
logical solutions.
The only condition under which the common law will survive is if the
HKSAR courts have freedom to declare laws unenforceable according to the
existing common law principles, precedents and standards. Only when
exercising their full powers of interpretation can HKSAR judges claim the
tide of common law judges. If the common law judiciary is to be preserved
at all, the NPC must pass three amendments, at a minimum, to the Basic

149. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
150. Joint Declaration, supra note 2, art. 3(2), Annex I. Actually, the Chinese
expanded the range of exceptions in article 3(2) with the following language in the Basic
Law- "The courts of the [HKSAR] shall have no jurisdiction over acts of state such as
defence andforeign affairs." Basic Law, supra note 1, art. 19 (emphasis added).
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Law: one returning full powers of judicial review to the courts,' 5 1 one
authorizing courts to strike down any law that cannot be interpreted in a
manner consistent with the BRO or any other law specifically intended to
implement Article 39, and one formalizing the principle that all ambiguities should be resolved in favor of an interpretation preserving the common
law. If the NPC refuses to pass these amendments, the common law system
is doomed to disappear.
D. Interpretation of Other Laws and Creation of New Laws
1. Hong Kong Courts
In the process of adjudicating cases, Hong Kong judges have the power to
interpret the meaning of legislation, subordinate legislation, common law,
rules of equity and customary law. They also create, modify and overrule
common law and rules of equity. Courts develop new legal rules in the
course of deciding cases that raise legal issues for which no law exists. In
the process of developing new legal norms, judges resort to general legal
principles and, through a process of reasoning by analogy to legal principles found in legal precedents, create a legal rule that resolves the novel
issue. Hong Kong's executive and legislative branches on the other hand,
have no power to interpret laws in specific cases. Hong Kong's executiveled government can only enact, amend and repeal laws with prospective
application. However, the power to enact new laws at any time gives the
executive and legislative branches the ability to control common law and
equity because ordinances are superior to, and effectively repeal, all inconsistent pre-existing laws, including those found in common law and equity.
2. Chinese Adjudicatory Organs
The legislative branch creates Chinese law, and several branches interpret,
but do not amend, repeal, or augment the law. The power to interpret Chinese laws is diffused among the legislative, executive and judicial branches.
The Xianfa delegates power to interpret statutes to the Standing Committee.15 2 The Standing Committee only recently began to issue any type of
legislative interpretations and, even now, does so rarely. Instead, it has
delegated most of its interpretation functions to the State Council, the
Supreme People's Procuratorate and the Supreme People's Adjudicatory
Organ.' 5 3 These three bodies may exercise their power at any time and
may issue interpretations, notices or other instruments either separately,
151. The International Commission ofJurists arrived at a similar conclusion in their
1991 study. They attacked Article 158 for its lack of clarity, for usurping the courts'
power of interpretation, for being unworkable and, most importantly, for contravening
the Joint Declaration. They similarly dismissed Article 160 as an unacceptable usurpation ofjudicial powers and recommended that all power to interpret laws be returned to
the courts. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JuRISTS, COUNTDOWN TO 1997: REPORT OF A
MISSION TO HONG KONG 83-84 (1991).
152. XIANFA art. 67, sec. 4 (1982) (P.R.C.).
153. Interpretation Resolution, supra note 76. Article 33 of the Adjudicatory Organ
Organization Law, which became effective Sept. 2, 1983, gives the same power to the
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together or jointly with other administrative organs. The Standing Committee settles conflicts between Procuratorate and Adjudicatory Organ
interpretations. 154 None of the lower adjudicatory organs or
procuratorates have similar interpretative power;' 5 5 however, the standing
committees of people's congresses and certain departments at the provininterpretative power over the laws, rules and regulations
cial level do have
15 6
issue.
they
The Supreme People's Adjudicatory Organ has the additional ability15to7
interpret national laws and regulations in the context of actual cases.
Although the Supreme People's Adjudicatory Organ is authorized to try
cases, 158 it is primarily a supervisory and administrative body and only
hears cases on very rare occasions. It interprets laws in cases being tried
by lower adjudicatory organs but it need not wait until a lower adjudicatory
organ solicits advice. It may intercede in ongoing cases in order to render
guidance in the correct interpretation of the law.
Nonetheless, non-legislative law is created in two ways. First, the CCP
creates law by when it issues documents "which the judiciary considers to
be normative." 159 Second, although the Supreme People's Adjudicatory
Organ is not specifically authorized to create law, it actually does create
law in two ways. It creates legal rules in situations where the NPC has
failed to enact relevant legislation. 160 However, instead of referring to
precedents or legal principles for guidance as is the practice in the common law system, the Supreme People's Adjudicatory Organ refers to current CCP policy for guidance. 16 1 It also creates new legal rules through its
power to issue interpretative documents that go beyond merely interpreting
national legislation to fill in legislative gaps. The documents have a quasiSome Chinese scholars go so far as to call some of them
legislative 1effect.
"caselaw." 62 However, the work of the Supreme People's Adjudicatory
Organ cannot be compared with the work of common law courts. The
Supreme People's Judiciary Organ organizes a work group to draft an opinion while common law judges work independently. The draft is circulated
among the judges for comments yet remains unavailable to the public.
Only after months of review and discussion does the Supreme People's
Supreme People's Adjudicatory Organ. Adjudicatory Organ Organization Law, supra
note 20, art. 33.
154. Interpretation Resolution, supra note 94, art. 2.
155. Guanyu Difang Geji Renmin FayuanBuying Zhiding SifaJieshixing Wenjiande Pifu
[Official Reply that RegionalAdjudicatory Organs at All Levels Should Not Draft Documents
Having the CharacterofJudicial Interpretations],ZHONGGUO FALo NiANjIA [CHINEsE LAW
YEARBOOK] 548 (1988).

156. Interpretation Resolution, supra note 94, art. 2.
157. Id.; Adjudicatory Organ Organization Law, supra note 20, art. 33 (The Supreme
People's Court renders interpretations on questions concerning specific application of
laws and decrees in judicial proceedings.).
158. Adjudicatory Organ Organization Law, supra note 20, art. 32.
159. Finder, supra note 13, at 151.
160. Id. at 165-66.
161. General Code of the Civil Law of the PRC (Apr. 12, 1986), art. 6.
162. CHEN, supra note 32, at 102.
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Adjudicatory Organ approve it. 16 3 In fact, the resulting document is more
akin to legislation than to judge-made law.
The Chinese do not recognize any of these activities to involve the creation of new law. From their perspective, the Supreme People's Adjudicatory Organ and CCP merely give opinions or explanations of the law or
policy. However, from the common law perspective, when the penalty for
disobeying a norm is a state-enforced sanction or imprisonment, the document or declaration containing the norm is law.
3. HKSAR Courts
The HKSAR courts should be able to interpret, create, modify and overrule
common law and rules of equity, subject only to the limitations imposed
by the common law. However, Articles 8 and 18 of the Basic Law, if taken
literally, would interfere with the courts' traditional powers as they do not
reflect the actual manner in which laws are created in Hong Kong. Article
8 provides that "[t]he laws previously in force in Hong Kong, that is, the
common law, rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation and cusLaw,
tomary law shall be maintained, except for any that contravene this
16 4 Artiand subject to any amendment by the legislature of the [HKSAR]."
cle 18 proves that "[t]he laws in force in the [HKSAR] shall be this Law, the
laws previously in force in Hong Kong as provided for in Article 8 of this
Law, and the laws enacted by the legislature of the Region." 1 65 These Articles are either examples of sloppy drafting, intentional limitations on traditional court powers or further evidence of the Chinese failure fully to grasp
the manner in which common law judges create, alter and overturn
existing common law and rules of equity.
If China intended Article 8 to be a conclusive statement on the manner
in which laws may be created, amended, or repealed, then Article 8 literally
means that Legco can amend colonial-era common law and rules of equity,
but the judiciary cannot. It further means that Legco cannot repeal colonial-era ordinances, subordinate legislation or customary law. Similarly,
the literal meaning of Article 18 is that new laws can only be created by the
legislature. Certainly, the Chinese do not intend a result that would make
a mockery of their promise to preserve the common law system for fifty
years. At most, Articles 8 and 18, like others in the Basic Law, expose the
difficulties the Chinese encounter in their attempts to accommodate a common law system within their socialist civil law mindset in which only the
legislature creates, amends or repeals laws.
E. Final Adjudication
1. FinalAdjudication in Hong Kong
Disappointed parties in Hong Kong have two opportunities to appeal their
cases after trial. Once a final non-appealable decision is rendered, the case
163. Finder, supra note 13, at 169.
164. Basic Law, supra note 1, art. 8.
165. Id. art. 18.
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is closed and neither courts nor any non-judicial body may reopen or
review it. Defendants convicted of crimes, however, may be able to obtain
a pardon from the Governor if, for example, compelling evidence of a miscarriage of justice surfaces after conviction. 166 The rule of no second trial
forces the government to build its cases against defendants very carefully
and to prosecute only when sufficient evidence exists for conviction. Similarly, it forces civil plaintiffs to prepare carefully prior to instituting a lawsuit. As a result, successful defendants in both criminal and civil cases can
resume their lives secure in the knowledge that the courts can never try
them again on the same set of facts.
2. "Final"Adjudication in China
Technically, Chinese adjudicatory organs also have the power of final adjudication (zhongshenquan). Parties disappointed with the outcome of their
cases in China have only one opportunity for appeal and the decision on
appeal is final. 16 7 In practice, however, a decision may not be final after
the appeal because, if the Supreme People's Adjudicatory Organ (or the
higher-level people's adjudicatory organs in cases tried at the lower level)
discovers a mistake, it has power to review cases or to order retrials.1 6 8
Although this procedure may be justified within the Chinese context where
only one appeal is allowed, the legal system is often abused for political
purposes, and the members of the adjudicatory organ and bar have a relatively low level of competence. 1 69 However, the review and retrial procedure is a powerful tool that can be abused and used for political purposes.
Final adjudication power and zhongshenquan, then, are not linguistically
equivalent.
3. Final Adjudication in HKSAR
The Chinese version of the Basic Law also contains the term zhongshenquan.170 The common law meaning of final adjudication should prevail
despite reports indicating that the Chinese would prefer to interpret the
term according to Chinese practice. Several Hong Kong newspapers,
including at least one pro-China one, report that, during Chinese-British
discussions on establishing the CFA, the Chinese side proposed a "mechanism for follow-up measures after the reaching of a verdict."1 7 1 Fortunately, the announcement was met with so much resistance from the Hong
Kong side that the Chinese immediately denied the reports. 17 2 The reports
166. Letters Patent, supra note 48, art. XV; Royal Instructions, supra note 51, art.

XXIV.

167. Adjudicatory Organ Organization Law, supra note 20, art. 12.

168. Id. art. 14.
169. Finder, supra note 13, at 203-04.
170. Basic Law, supra note 1, arts. 2, 82.
171. Shi, supra note 114. See Blyth, supra note 113.
172. ZHONGGUO XINWEN SHE [NEw CHINA NEws AGENCY], May 5, 1995, translated in
F.B.I.S.-CHI-95-088, May 8, 1995, at 102; S. CHINA MORNING Posr, May 6, 1995, at 1, In

F.B.I.S.-CHI-95-088, May 8, 1995, at 102 ("Mr. Lu dismissed as 'ridiculous' reports that
Beijing wanted to put in place a higher authority than the Court of Final Appeal.").
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are probably true as the Chinese have a practice of leaking a proposed
policy to the media, waiting for the public and official reaction, and then
denying the statement if public outcry is too great.
The proposal itself is also completely consistent with China's own
legal practice and with China's wariness of common law judicial powers.
From the Chinese perspective, the idea of setting up a body superior to the
CFA is not radical. China's public refutation of the proposal does not necessarily reflect a decision to trust and respect Hong Kong's legal system.
On the contrary, it is additional evidence of the Chinese government's lack
of understanding of the common law system. It reveals that officials do not
yet understand how the rule of law and common law principles and practices impose significant internal constraints on the court's powers. For
example, they apparently have yet to realize that, although judges have
great freedoms, those freedoms are exercised within parameters constructed over several hundred years through compromises reached between
the executive, legislative, judiciary and the public. The reports just add to
other evidence pointing to close Chinese scrutiny of the courts. If the Chinese perceive the judiciary to constitute a threat to their control over the
HKSAR, they will probably seek to impose a method for "supervising" the
courts.
Conclusion
The transition period during which Hong Kong's common law legal system
will undergo a metamorphosis from a common law system into a common/
socialist/civil law system will involve numerous uncertainties and continual struggles between two political and social ideologies and two jurisprudences. The period of change will force members of the common law
judiciary to undergo an uncomfortable adjustment as they try to accommodate themselves to new constraints on judicial powers and to a new jurisprudence. At the same time, members of the Standing Committee will have
no choice but to learn and respect a new legal language and to understand
an alien legal philosophy.
The process will not be pleasant nor the tasks easy for officials in
Hong Kong or in China. Retention of the viable and internationallyrespected pre-handover legal system depends upon the mutual respect and
cooperation of all parties. Both sides must endeavor to understand each
other's legal systems and legal philosophies and be willing to work together
to arrive at mutually-acceptable definitions of legal terms and issues in the
Basic Law. They must find unique solutions to meet the unique challenges
posed by the "one country-two legal systems" model. Solutions proposed
by this Article include the following changes to the Basic Law:
1. amendment of Articles 17, 158 and 160 restoring full powers of judicial
review to the courts;
2. a provision stipulating that all non-administrative provisions are directly
enforceable;
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3. a provision authorizing the HKSAR courts to resolve all ambiguities in the
Basic Law in a manner consistent with the preservation of the common law
system;
4. amendment of Article 35 leaving no doubt that the Basic Law is intended
to preserve the common law right of the judiciary to review acts of the executive branch, including those of the Chief Executive;
5. amendment of Article 39 authorizing courts to strike down any law that
cannot be interpreted in a manner consistent with Article 39 or any law specifically intended to implement Article 39; and
6. amendment of Article 8 preserving the common law power of the courts
to create, modify, and overrule the common law and rules of equity.
If China refuses to take the positive steps necessary to ensure the survival of the common law system, and if the Chinese, British and Hong Kong
governments continue to ignore the constitutional issues raised by this
Article, then the international community may justifiably hold Hong
Kong's sovereigns accountable for any resulting chaos or harm to Hong
Kong's social, economic and political stability and prosperity.

